This paper examines the complex question of whether artificial intelligence (AI) entities can or should hold legal rights and duties within existing legal frameworks. As AI systems grow increasingly sophisticated, autonomous, and integrated into society, traditional legal categories—designed for human and corporate entities—face unprecedented challenges. Through analysis of existing legal personhood theories, comparative examination of recent legal developments, and consideration of philosophical perspectives on personhood and moral status, this paper argues that while full legal personhood for AI remains problematic, functional, limited forms of legal status may be both necessary and conceptually defensible. The analysis reveals that rights and duties for AI entities should be approached functionally rather than anthropomorphically, with legal frameworks calibrated to the specific capabilities, roles, and potential impacts of different AI systems. This paper contributes to the emerging discourse on AI governance by proposing a graduated approach to AI legal status that balances innovation with accountability and human welfare.
Dakshina Saraswathy (Wed,) studied this question.