ABSTRACT One of the main epistemic norms of mainstream epistemology revolves around how to reject epistemic relativism and embrace universalism. The argument has frequently been that different epistemological perspectives are incompatible and hence breed protracted disagreement. Being incompatible means that one cannot judge which of these incompatible epistemic viewpoints are valid. To mitigate this obstacle, it is argued that epistemic relativism should not be taken seriously because of its potential to promote protracted disagreement and conflict. In this essay, I argue that one of the foundations of cognitive injustices around the world emerges from this assumption that for there to be knowledge, one ought to embrace epistemological universalism while abandoning wholesale epistemic diversity. I do not only demonstrate that this assumption rests on a mistake but also that epistemological universalism, which is frequently deployed to support the norm of dissolving difference, is a hidden relativism. The rest of the essay examines the virtues of epistemic relativism to the prospect of epistemic diversity within the context of decoloniality.
Husein Inusah (Tue,) studied this question.
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