Abstract This article explores the relationship between graded, probabilistic representations of partial belief (that is, credences) and binary representations of outright belief. It is often argued that outright beliefs simplify our credal reasoning. However, Staffel (2019) complicates this picture by arguing that if outright beliefs help us to update our credences through a process called pseudo-conditionalization, then beliefs do not actually simplify credal reasoning. This is because Staffel’s model of pseudo-conditionalization is just as computationally intractable as the exact Bayesian process of credal updating via conditionalization. I put forward a different model of pseudo-conditionalization that is computationally tractable. My model depends crucially on the existence of outright beliefs whose objects are not individual propositions but are instead probabilistic influence relations between propositions. Thus I provide a new account of the belief–credence relation according to which beliefs simplify our credal reasoning via a process of pseudo-conditionalization.
David Kinney (Tue,) studied this question.