The article is devoted to the analysis of post-war reflections of Marshal of the USSR Alexander Mikhailovich Vasilevsky on the reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in 1941-1942 and the key stages of the Great Patriotic War. The relevance of the study is due to the need to reassess the responsibility of the military leadership for miscalculations in strategic planning, as well as the introduction of new sources into scientific circulation - archival interviews, transcripts and late statements of the marshal. The work uses the memoirs of A. M. Vasilevsky, official documents and unpublished evidence, which were analyzed using historical-genetic, source studies and textual methods. The study established that the marshal pointed out the shortcomings of the pre-war operational plan (failure to predict a surprise attack, underestimation of the experience of Poland and France), the mistakes of I. V. Stalin (refusal of a preventive strike, ignoring intelligence data) and the role of the General Staff in strategic management. The author paid special attention to the evolution of A. M. Vasilevsky’s assessments: from softened formulations in the memoirs of the 1970s to harsher criticism in archival materials, which is associated with the easing of censorship and opening up access to new documents. The results of the work allow us to clarify the historical perspective, demonstrating how the personality of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the system of military command influenced decision-making, and also open up opportunities for discussions about the mechanisms of responsibility in the context of the personality cult. The findings are important for military-historical research, analysis of strategic planning and the formation of an objective view of the historical process.
Georgy V. Andrianov (Thu,) studied this question.