This paper considers the consequences of England’s 17th-century dramatic expansion of overseas trade for the persistence and turnover of political elites. I study the extent to which “new” commercial economic interests—individuals involved in expanding trade—obtained Parliamentary representation, as well as the extent to which those individuals were connected to members of the incumbent parliamentary elite or hereditary aristocracy. I do so using an original dataset on Members of Parliament (MPs) spanning more than two centuries (⇠1550–1750). Despite the dramatic expansion of trade during the period, I find that only a modest share of Parliament represented the commercial sector, and overseas traders never constituted a majority of commercial representatives. The parliamentary entré of trading interests manifested most acutely via investors in trade rather than active participants. Moreover, the growing Atlantic economy was associated with little turnover in MPs’ social and family backgrounds. Broadly, I find that elites persisted across the economic changes of the long 17th century and were well-positioned to capture many of the early gains for themselves.
Adriane Fresh (Wed,) studied this question.