The responsibility to protect online: Lessons from R2P and the politics of Western‐Centricity in online harms regulation

The pursuit of reducing online harms has become an integral part of both internet and digital platform governance, with states around the world seeking to implement policies and regulatory mechanisms to address the issue at breakneck speed. In this editorial, we suggest the race to have nation states protect citizens from harm online is reminiscent of the era of humanitarian interventionism in international relations. From the 1990s, the urgency for states and international organisations to intervene into global conflicts was sparked by the atrocities of genocide in Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia (Srebrenica) in 1995, and in Sudan, in the region of Darfur, from 2003, when key institutions had failed to act (Grünfeld Hao, 2015; Stefan, 2017, p. 90). Among these criticisms is the desire for R2P to be an emancipatory principle—or what critical scholars refer to a quest for freedom, the breaking of chains away from norms which both constrict and violate human rights (Bohman, 2005)—as an inherently Western approach (Glover, 2011, p. 10; Naz Greene, 2017; Schmid, 2004, p. 375) as politically loaded with problematic outcomes. Namely, as articulated by the U.N. states do not agree with the definition of terrorism or who should or shouldn't be labelled terrorists, resulting in a lack of cohesion when addressing incidences of terrorism globally. Furthermore, the act of labelling a 'terrorist' has been noted to be based on the political subjectivity of states (Jackson, 2008). Labelling can, therefore, be weaponised in accordance with state interest and the taking down of content labelled 'terrorist' material can produce the same harmful outcomes (Zelin, 2023, p. 560). So too could definitions of online harms be employed within specific contexts to attack marginalised groups (Watkin, 2023, p. 530). States also define hate speech according to what their interests perceive to be harmful. While in Australia, within a multicultural context—the definition of hate speech is presented as beliefs and identity-based discrimination (see e-Safety Commissioner, 2019, p. 4), whereas in China, hate speech is framed as a national security issue (Fu, 2019, p. 1). Another layer of incompatibility is added when considering the definitions presented within a service provider/platform's terms of service—as entities that transcend borders, who need to regulate what is produced by users residing in various political and legal contexts. Thus, these contrasts can result in lack of translatability, transparency, and the development of insecurity, with certain societies and individuals excluded from protection. Do the complexities of online harms mean that harms should not be addressed? No. In a reality in which the interplay between users, platforms and governments is increasingly digitised, it is imperative to regulate harmful content that can impact on the wellbeing of states and their citizens. However, a compartmentalisation of the definition of harms, one that incorporates the experiences beyond the West and considers harms as a global phenomenon, one that transcends borders and the Western moral threshold is equally imperative. While the field of online harms regulation is still emerging, there is a wide pool of research that considers the implication of regulatory measures—not exclusively within the online harms space—that consider the aspect of harm from various facets of the globe—some of which are included in this issue of Policy & Internet. In this volume, authors from an array of disciplines explore harms posed by increased digitalisation, prescribe proposals to remedy issues ranging from content moderation, the advancement of AI and cyber operations within conflict zones, or highlight potential gaps in addressing harms. In Moderating Borderline Content while Respecting Fundamental Values, Macdonald & Vaughan, (2023) explore the parameters of so-called lawful but awful content within the context of extremist/terrorist content and propose three principles of content moderation. The first is definitional clarity. Second is necessity and proportionality. Third is transparency. The authors (Macdonald & Vaughan, 2023) argue that while a number of platforms now publish their content moderation policies and transparency data reports, these largely focus on violative, not borderline content. Moreover, there remain questions around access to data for independent researchers and transparency at the level of the individual user. Mandate to Overblock? Understanding the impact of the European Union's Article 17 on copyright content moderation on YouTube (Dergacheva & Katzenbach, 2024) presents the results of a study measuring possible overblocking due to copyright moderation and changes in the diversity of cultural products supply on YouTube in two EU member states comparable in size and population, Germany and France. The findings show that during the period examined, 2019 to 2022, significant differences were identified between Germany and France in terms of the takedowns of videos from categories prone to copyright moderation. In 'To say report it, well, it seems a little useless': Evaluating Australian expectations of online service providers and reducing online child sexual exploitation, Francis et al. (2024) present the findings of a survey of 482 Australian adults regarding their expectations of technology companies and governments in relation to key issues of online child protection. The results suggest strong demands for greater action by online service providers (OSPs) against sexual exploitation, and for governments to legally enshrine some obligations for OSPs, as well as concern about the privacy of innocent users and about the data handling and cybersecurity of governments and technology companies. Core Concerns: The Need for a Governance Framework to Protect Global Internet Infrastructure (Broeders & Sukumar, 2024) explores the digital dynamics of the war in Ukraine and threats to global Internet infrastructure from geopolitically motivated cyber operations. The paper, while noting that states increasingly acknowledge the need to protect the public core of the internet, argues that norms and international law are still ill-equipped to regulate damaging cyber operations, given unsettled questions regarding the sovereignty of states over global Internet infrastructure, and the precise scope of their existing international obligations towards its protection. In The unjust burden of digital inclusion for low-income migrant parents, Notley and Aziz (2024) consider the significant digital inclusion disparities between low- and high-income households across countries, along with the lack of in-depth research about the relationship between digital and social participation in low-income family households. Presenting long-term ethnographic research with low-income, migrant family households in the most culturally diverse region of Australia—Western Sydney, the authors argue that household digital inclusion is perceived as necessary and important by parents—but also as a burden that has social, financial and emotional dimensions. Flew (2024) in Mediated Trust, the Internet and Artificial Intelligence: Ideas, Interests, Institutions, Futures addresses the question of trust in communication, or mediated trust, with regard to the historical evolution of the Internet and, more recently, debates around the impacts of artificial intelligence (AI). The author proposes a 'Three I's' framework of ideas, interests, and institutions as a way of understanding how and why current proposals for greater regulation of digital platforms counterpose questions around credibility and social licence for digital tech giants against a dominant set of ideas around the Internet as a privileged domain of free speech. Last, in Social Imaginaries of Digital Technology in South Korea during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Yoon (2024) examines common themes identified in discourses about digital technology-driven responses to COVID-19 in South Korea. By examining how digital technology is represented and thematised in policy and news discourses, the study explores how particular modes of society and societal order are circulated and particular visions of the postpandemic society emerge. In addition, explores the role of the government that extends institutional forces to disseminate particular visions of the postpandemic society while addressing the media's response to the government-circulated dominant social imaginary.