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Historical literature oflen suggests that Józef Piłsudski, the Commander-in-Chief, won the war with Soviet Russia, but lost the peace. He lost in many respects: he lost his Polish eastern policy, which ended in failure; he lost to the Sejm and politicians who were pushing for an armistice with the Bolsheviks and who took the matters of peace in Riga into their own hands. These politicians were also asked: did nothing in Riga actually depend on Piłsudski? What did he know about the pending talks, did he try to influence them somehow behind the scenes? Did he see any alternative to the decisions being made in the Latvian capital? And finally – how did he remark on and evaluate the provisions of the Riga peace? The purpose of this article is to analyze all these narratives, bring out their main themes and re-examine them. The main conclusion is that Piłsudski’s defeat in Riga was also a defeat for Poland: of its attempt to achieve independence as a superpower between Germany and Russia. The failure of Piłsudski’s eastern policy, of which Riga may be a symbol, determined not only further Polish–Soviet relations, but the fate of Poland in general in the interwar two decades, a fact of which Piłsudski was well aware.
Krzysztof Kloc (Fri,) studied this question.