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Adversarial misuse, particularly through `jailbreaking' that circumvents a model's safety and ethical protocols, poses a significant challenge for Large Language Models (LLMs). This paper delves into the mechanisms behind such successful attacks, introducing a hypothesis for the safety mechanism of aligned LLMs: intent security recognition followed by response generation. Grounded in this hypothesis, we propose CodeChameleon, a novel jailbreak framework based on personalized encryption tactics. To elude the intent security recognition phase, we reformulate tasks into a code completion format, enabling users to encrypt queries using personalized encryption functions. To guarantee response generation functionality, we embed a decryption function within the instructions, which allows the LLM to decrypt and execute the encrypted queries successfully. We conduct extensive experiments on 7 LLMs, achieving state-of-the-art average Attack Success Rate (ASR). Remarkably, our method achieves an 86.6\% ASR on GPT-4-1106.
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Huijie Lv
Xinjiang Agricultural University
Xiao Wang
Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Yuansen Zhang
Wenzhou Medical University
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Lv et al. (Mon,) studied this question.
synapsesocial.com/papers/68e779ebb6db6435876ee929 — DOI: https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2402.16717
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