Abstract This article examines systemic rivalry between Indonesian criminal justice agencies, highlighting the inherent conflicts that arise when institutional actors with distinct values and priorities interact. It argues that analysing these conflicts reveals underlying power dynamics that hinder the system’s effectiveness. Indonesia serves as a compelling case study for analysing inter-agency conflict, where the source of conflict transcends procedural differences and stems from a power struggle driven by institutional self-preservation. Utilizing interviews, court decisions, media reports, and legislative analysis, this article delves into the power struggle between the police, prosecutors, and the anti-corruption agency (KPK). The analysis reveals the police to be at the centre of this conflict, resisting reforms that threaten their institutional survival. This article then argues that substantial reform of Indonesia’s criminal justice system would be difficult to achieve, as such rivalry is driven by patronage politics both within and outside the institution.
Aristo Pangaribuan (Tue,) studied this question.
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