Abstract : Audit quality serves as a cornerstone of financial transparency and investor confidence, yet it remains significantly shaped by institutional and governance contexts across jurisdictions. This review synthesizes existing literature on how variations in institutional frameworks, legal systems, and corporate governance mechanisms influence audit quality across emerging and developed economies. Drawing from institutional theory, agency theory, and resource dependence perspectives, the study examines how enforcement regimes, ownership structures, regulatory strength, and board characteristics jointly determine audit effectiveness. Comparative insights are developed from studies in economies such as Kazakhstan, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States, highlighting both convergence and divergence in institutional trajectories. Findings suggest that stronger legal enforcement, effective governance mechanisms, and greater audit market competition tend to improve audit quality, whereas weak institutional environments, concentrated ownership, and political interference undermine auditor independence. The review identifies persistent challenges in emerging economies, particularly regarding regulatory capture, limited audit oversight, and constrained professional capacity. The paper concludes by proposing an integrated institutional–governance framework for understanding audit quality variations, emphasizing the need for context-sensitive policy reforms and harmonized regulatory standards.
Madina Taldybayeva (Tue,) studied this question.