The Enquiry Interpretation of Hume’s Sensible Knave

Abstract Predominantly, previous interpretations of Hume’s discussion of the sensible knave embrace the following three claims: (1) that Hume raises the topic of the knave to respond to the ‘why be just?’ question; (2) that Hume’s discussion of the knave extends the theory of justice and moral psychology developed within the Treatise ; and (3) that Hume’s reply to the knave is unsatisfactory. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the knave passage that draws exclusively on the second Enquiry and shows that Hume’s discussion of the knave follows consistently from the conclusions Hume draws within it. Beyond challenging the above three claims, the Enquiry interpretation highlights Hume’s views on the connection between happiness and virtue, shows that Hume is most plausibly read as a qualitative hedonist, and suggests that the differences between the accounts of justice within the Treatise and the second Enquiry are more significant than has been previously acknowledged.