executive summary: This article tracks and examines the dramatically changing character of bilateral economic relations between the U.S. and the People's Republic of China (PRC) from the outbreak of the so-called trade war in early 2018 through 2023 in a three-part periodization. main argument A chronological examination of official statements, international agreements, independent journalistic accounts, and scholarly research confirms that U.S. trade policy toward China from January 2018 to December 2023 progressed from statements about unfair trade practices toward justifications that emphasized national security. While the evolving conflict first centered on economic inequity, it began changing character with the Trump administration's harsh criticism of the U.S. trade deficit with the PRC and allegations of intellectual property theft. In 2020–21 U.S. sanctions became predominantly linked to political concerns, especially human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. In 2022–23 another shift occurred, this time under the Biden administration, as executive orders and bans targeted measures aimed at technologies and industries associated with security and defense. The successive adjustment of official justifications nevertheless did little to mitigate substantive bilateral disagreements over trade and geopolitics or the collateral damage done to global economic exchange. The current trajectory of the U.S.-China trade war is likely to produce markedly adverse outcomes for both sides as well as for third parties. policy implications • Despite differences between how President Donald Trump in his first term and his successor President Joe Biden approached and portrayed the growing U.S. rivalry with China, there is consistency after 2017 in the U.S. policy of treating China as a looming threat and rival. • In the second Trump administration in 2025–28, U.S. China policy is unlikely to be thoroughly revised but possibly could be realigned toward sanctions focused on trade equity and business practice fairness. The administration would do well to execute a calibrated, partial break with the Chinese economy rather than jeopardize economic relations overall, which could adversely affect the U.S.'s own economic performance. • The U.S. should mitigate the dilemma of allies and partners that it is inducing to align with more closely in sectors where these partners find drastically reducing their economic ties with China difficult—for example, by facilitating friend- and near-shoring on favorable terms.
Ekelund et al. (Thu,) studied this question.