The subject of the study is the transformation of executive power models under conditions of high party fragmentation, examined through the example of the Israeli political system as a paradigmatic empirical case. The object of the study is the coalition-parliamentary mechanisms of forming and functioning of executive power in contemporary democratic systems. The author discusses in detail the institutional patterns that determine the decline in managerial coherence and strategic coordination in conditions of a multiplicity of political actors, autonomous decision-making centers, and the complexity of party structure. Special attention is given to the relationship between the expansion of political representation and changes in the functional characteristics of executive power, including the redistribution of responsibility, an increase in transaction costs, and the transformation of intra-party and inter-coalition interaction mechanisms. The Israeli model is analyzed not as an exceptional case but as an extreme form of manifestation of the structural limitations of the coalition-party system, allowing for the identification of institutional limits of governance in a fragmented party space. The methodological basis of the research comprises comparative political analysis, an institutional approach, and elements of veto player theory. Methods include qualitative analysis of political institutions, comparative analysis of national cases, and interpretation of contemporary models of public governance. The main conclusions of the study are the propositions about the systemic nature of the transformation of executive power under conditions of high party fragmentation and the cumulative dynamics of governance limitations in the 2010s and 2020s. It is shown that the effects of coalition complexity, previously interpreted as a cost of expanded representation, acquire a structural character and affect mechanisms of strategic coordination. The increase in the number of party actors and institutional blocking points leads to a rise in transaction costs and a reduction in the planning horizon. The novelty of the study lies in interpreting the Israeli case not as an exception but as an extreme form of manifestation of general patterns in coalition-parliamentary systems. It is substantiated that the Israeli model captures the extreme expression of trends that are reproduced in several European parliamentary democracies. A significant contribution of the author is the combination of comparative analysis with empirical knowledge of the institutional practices of the Israeli political system, which allows for interpreting processes not only at the formal level but also in terms of the actual functioning of coalition power. The results enable viewing the current stage of development of coalition-parliamentary models as a phase of extreme institutional tension, during which the limitations of strategic governance are intensified while democratic procedures are maintained.
Yuri Borisovich Bocharov (Sun,) studied this question.