This paper argues that Pierre Hadot’s conception of philosophy as a way of life allows us better to understand Plutarch’s practical-ethical writings, and their specific philosophical intentionality, than leading approaches from Ziegler and Van Hoof. We open by showing how Hadot at decisive moments of his metaphilosophical work draws on these texts from Plutarch, notably as principal evidence for what he calls spiritual exercises in ancient philosophy. Part 2 examines Ziegler’s and Van Hoof’s readings of Plutarch’s practical-ethical writings, as ‘popular philosophy’ or else as artful documents wherein Plutarch advanced his cultural capital within the second sophistic. Part 3 challenges these views, considering Hadot’s idea of philosophy as a way of life, contending that Hadot’s approach allows us to accommodate those social dynamics and the rhetorical features of the practical-ethical writings, whilst preserving Plutarch’s specifically philosophical intentionality within them to bring theoretical ethics to practical life, including through therapeutic prescriptions of exercises to readers. The concluding part 4 takes up the theme of “humanities-based therapeutic practices as tools for addressing contemporary challenges.” It makes a case for the especial pertinence of Plutarch’s therapeutic writings, amongst the ancients’, in our social-mediatic technosociety: not simply because of their practical emphasis on exercises highlighted by Pierre Hadot, but because of Plutarch’s particular concerns with the forms of social-linguistic vices which social media today inflames: notably, boastfulness, susceptibility to flattery, forms of inattention, gossiping and over-concern for others’ affairs.
Matthew Sharpe (Tue,) studied this question.