What question did this study set out to answer?

To explore how Leibniz’s metaphysical views reconcile bliss and the problem of the damned.

March 10, 2026Open Access

Leibniz, the problem of regret, and the problem of the essentially damned

Puntos clave

To explore how Leibniz’s metaphysical views reconcile bliss and the problem of the damned.
Analyzes Leibniz's theory of superessentialism.
Examines philosophical implications of divine decision-making.
Discusses the relationship between coexistence of bliss and regret.
Proposes a solution to reconcile perfect bliss with the damned's existence.
Finds that Leibniz’s metaphysics justifies the existence of those who are essentially damned.

Resumen

Abstract The problem of regret is the problem of reconciling the perfect bliss of the blessed in heaven with their desire or wish that things had somehow gone better for the damned. Leibniz’s superessentialism, according to which every event that occurs in the life of a person is essential to that person, provides a unique and robust solution to this problem. But it also entails that those who are damned are essentially damned. What could possibly justify God’s decision to create such persons? In this paper, I argue that Leibniz’s larger metaphysical system has the resources to provide a unique and robust solution to this problem as well.

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