Multi-unit common value auctions in which bidders submit demand functions are used for a variety of purposes, including selling government debt (Treasury auctions) and allocating liquidity (repo auctions). Typically, either a discriminatory or a uniform-price format is used. In this paper, we consider the incentive for participation by relatively uninformed bidders in the presence of more informed bidders under these formats. We characterize the equilibrium under a discriminatory auction and show that discriminatory pricing inhibits uninformed participation. In contrast, the equilibria we construct under a uniform pricing rule show that profitable uninformed participation can occur. The usefulness of widening participation in Treasury auctions makes the latter format a natural choice in these auctions, providing an explanation for the switch to the uniform-price format in US Treasury auctions. We also apply our results to repo auctions and show that a uniform-price format can reduce the ability of a central bank to steer interest rates. This sheds light on the reason for the switch away from the uniform-price format by several central banks in conducting repo auctions. We also consider the question of information aggregation and show that uniform-price auctions might fail to do so. The results also offer an explanation for the fact that the ECB, as well as several other central banks, prefer to allocate liquidity through a fixed-rate tender rather than either uniform-price or discriminatory auctions.
Arup Daripa (Mon,) studied this question.