Beyond the Lab: Cognitive Neuroscience in Real‐World Contexts

Cognitive neuroscience has made remarkable advances by conducting rigorously controlled experiments inside the laboratory. However, the generalizability and real-world relevance of these findings remain limited, in part due to fundamental, often unexamined, assumptions about how cognition operates across species and contexts. In this viewpoint, we critically evaluate three commonly held assumptions underlying current cognitive neuroscience practices: (1) laboratory animals serve as accurate representatives of their wild conspecifics; (2) animal models effectively mirror human cognitive processes; and (3) digital twins provide faithful, functionally equivalent representations of their real-world analogs. We argue that these assumptions, if left unexamined, risk narrowing our understanding of cognition by excluding the behavioral flexibility, environmental variability, and agency that natural settings afford. We advocate for an expanded notion of ecological validity to include the naturalness of both subjects and environments, and we highlight methodological shifts, such as the use of enriched experimental contexts, mobile neuroimaging, and immersive virtual environments. By reassessing these foundational assumptions, we advocate for an approach to cognitive neuroscience that better reflects the complexity of real-world behavior, species-specific cognition, and the environments, physical or virtual, in which cognition is embedded.