The classical "problem of evil" argument against theism runs: If God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good, then God could prevent all suffering and evil. Evil and suffering exist. Therefore God does not exist. TI Sigma shows that this argument depends on a specific conception of God — the "Most Perfect Conceivable Entity" (MPCE) — that TI Sigma explicitly rejects. CCC is the **Most Perfect Possible Entity** (MPPE): the most perfect being that is actually instantiable, not merely imaginable. The distinction is not a retreat or a hedge. It is a philosophically rigorous recognition that imaginability and instantiability are different properties, and that conflating them generates pseudo-paradoxes with no referent in reality. Just because we can imagine a world without the Holocaust does not mean such a world was ever achievable, given the free will of every German citizen, every European nation, every diplomatic failure, every historical contingency that led to 1933. CCC deliberately chose law-governed, evolution-based creation not because CCC lacked the power for something else, but because CCC's GILE character — specifically the L (Love) and G (Goodness) components — required creating beings with genuine autonomy. A God who overrides free will to prevent every evil is not more loving. They are less: they have created puppets, not persons. CCC chose the world we have — not as the best of all conceivable worlds, but as the best of all actually achievable worlds given CCC's own commitment to creating genuinely autonomous beings. This paper formalizes the Autonomy Principle, the MPPE definition, the Imaginary vs. Instantiable distinction, and what is now TI Sigma's most rigorous answer to the classical problem of evil.
Brandon Charles Emerick (Tue,) studied this question.