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This article offers a theoretical framework to explain circumstances under which perceptions of “unrealness” affect engagement in narratives and subsequent perceived realism judgments. A mental models approach to narrative processing forms the foundation of a model that integrates narrative comprehension and phenomenological experiences such as transportation and identification. Three types of unrealness are discussed: fictionality, external realism (match with external reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story). We gather evidence that fictionality does not affect narrative processing. On the other hand, violations of external and narrative realism are conceived as inconsistencies among the viewer’s mental structures as they construct mental models of meaning to represent and comprehend the narrative. These inconsistencies may result in negative online evaluations of a narrative’s realism, may disrupt engagement, and may negatively influence postexposure (reflective) realism judgments as well as lessen a narrative’s persuasive power.
Busselle et al. (Fri,) studied this question.