How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice*

A SUFFICIENTLY nuanced theory of distributive justice should be able to accomplish the following two theoretical tasks: it should provide grounds for meeting the needs of people who are not able to contribute to the production of the goods necessary to sustain them; and it should provide grounds for adequately compensating those who do contribute to the production of such goods.The first task suggests a basis for distribution that is independent of contribution; it rests perhaps on a moral ideal requiring that the basic needs of all individuals be met.The second task suggests a basis for distribution that is in some way connected to contribution.It rests, perhaps, upon an ideal of reciprocity according to which one is owed a share of the social goods she helps create, all things being equal.The theory of John Rawls-now the standard-bearer for accounts of justicecontains an idealizing assumption that was largely, though not completely, overlooked until underscored in a recent book by Eva Kittay. 1 This assumptionwhich I will call "the fully cooperating assumption"-states that all citizens will be regarded, for the purposes of Rawls's theory, as physically and mentally competent and hence able to participate fully in schemes of cooperation. 2Rawls's