What question did this study set out to answer?

The paper examines Suárez’s voluntarist perspective on the will and its relationship to intellectual judgment and causation.

April 16, 2026Open Access

Suárez on the Will as a Two-Way Power

Puntos clave

The paper examines Suárez’s voluntarist perspective on the will and its relationship to intellectual judgment and causation.
Analyzed Suárez’s arguments against intellectual determinism.
Explored the distinction between efficient cause and final cause in relation to the will.
Discussed the concept of normative attraction and its implications for freedom.
Demonstrated that the intellect cannot impose decisions on the will.
Showed that the final cause influences the will's attraction based on the goodness of the goal.
Argued that true freedom arises from the ability of the will to reject normative influences.

Resumen

Abstract In his theory of action, Suárez defends a voluntarist position. He claims that we are free agents because our will is a two-way power: it can always accept or reject the action-guiding judgement that is presented by the intellect. But why is the will not obliged to accept this judgement? The paper discusses this question by relating Suárez’s theory of the will to his theory of causation. It first examines his arguments against intellectual determinism, paying particular attention to his claim that the intellect is not an efficient cause: it cannot act upon the will and force it to accept a judgement. The paper then analyses Suárez’s account of the relevant cause by focusing on the goal of an action. The goal acts as a final cause, and if the goal is not perfectly good, it does not fully attract the will; consequently, the will can reject it. The paper spells out the functioning of the final cause as a form of normative attraction and argues that the issue of normativity is at the centre of Suárez’s theory of the will: we are free because our will can resist normative attraction.

Me gusta

Guardar

Ver artículo completo