Debates regarding involuntary treatment for substance use disorders have intensified in the context of escalating overdose mortality and system-level strain. These proposals raise fundamental questions in psychiatric ethics concerning decisional capacity, agency, proportionality, and the justification for liberty restrictions. Addiction presents a distinctive challenge: decisional capacity may appear intact at discrete moments, while agency remains predictably unstable across time in conditions of chronic risk. This Perspective argues that addiction exposes limitations in strictly moment-based applications of the capacity doctrine. Drawing on ethical theory, clinical reasoning, and selected empirical literature, the manuscript evaluates involuntary addiction treatment primarily through normative criteria of justification rather than relying solely on outcome estimation. It identifies evidentiary limitations in the current literature and articulates heightened substantive and procedural thresholds that must be satisfied for coercive interventions to be ethically defensible. These include demonstrable impairment linked to near-term serious harm, exhaustion of less restrictive alternatives, clearly defined therapeutic objectives, and independent oversight with outcome monitoring. This paper does not advocate for categorical endorsement or rejection of involuntary treatment; rather, it proposes structured guardrails to guide psychiatric engagement under conditions of uncertainty.
Anees Bahji (Wed,) studied this question.