41 Abstract Mandatory human rights and environmental due diligence (mHRDD) laws increasingly position lead firms at the centre of global value chain (GVC) governance, yet the capacity of civil liability to function as an effective enforcement mechanism remains uncertain. This article examines the French Duty of Vigilance Law as an early and influential attempt to operationalise HRDD through private civil enforcement. Drawing on law and economics theory, it analyses how the French regime combines harm-based liability for damages with act-based injunctions in an effort to create ex ante preventive incentives. Recent case law, in particular the La Poste appellate judgment, is shown to reinforce the act-based dimension of the regime by articulating more concrete, risk-based expectations for vigilance plans. Empirically, the article revisits and extends a 2022 difference-in-differences (d-i-d) analysis using updated 2025 LSEG data. Despite substantial revisions in ESG scores, the results indicate statistically significant improvements in human rights scores following the introduction of the French Vigilance Law, especially among initially low-performing firms. Although these findings show very positive effects resulting from the French Vigilance Law, when assessed in light of the well-documented limitations of ESG ratings, these improvements are perhaps more likely to reflect strengthened procedural compliance, disclosure, and internal risk governance than substantive reductions in underlying harm per se.
Lafarre et al. (Sun,) studied this question.