Under the context of advancing high-quality development, intergovernmental collaboration, as a pivotal governance approach, has emerged as a critical pathway to facilitating cross-regional enterprise cooperation, optimizing resource allocation, and enhancing overall competitiveness. To clarify the evolutionary mechanisms and stability strategies of cross-regional enterprise cooperation behavior under intergovernmental collaboration, this paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model featuring two cross-regional enterprises and intergovernmental collaborative bodies.Numerical simulations are conducted focusing on six dimensions: initial willingness to cooperate, changes in cross-regional enterprise cooperation income (Formula: see text) and operational cost (Formula: see text), default penalty intensity, and income distribution coefficient, interaction effect of variables and heterogeneity analysis. The main conclusions are: (1) A sufficiently high initial willingness of intergovernmental collaboration (Formula: see text) is a prerequisite for enterprise cooperation. (2) Net benefits of cooperation (Formula: see text) make cooperation faster. (3) Default penalties have a critical threshold effect: below the threshold, cooperation collapses; above the threshold, cooperation becomes stable. (4) Fair division of benefits (Formula: see text) stimulates cooperation; large default penalty can to some extent make up for the unfairness of benefit distribution. (5) Asymmetric initial willingness between core and peripheral cities are overcome by strong intergovernmental cooperation.Based on these findings, targeted countermeasures to promote cross-regional enterprise cooperation are proposed.
Mao et al. (Wed,) studied this question.