The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks

April 01 2000 The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks Scott D. Sagan Scott D. Sagan Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Scholar Author and Article Information Scott D. Sagan Associate Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. Online ISSN: 1531-4804 Print ISSN: 0162-2889 © 2000 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2000 International Security (2000) 24 (4): 85–115. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560318 Cite Icon Cite Permissions Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Views Icon Views Article contents Figures The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks. International Security 2000; 24 (4): 85–115. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560318 Download citation file: Ris (Zotero) Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search All ContentAll JournalsInternational Security Search Advanced Search This content is only available as a PDF. © 2000 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology2000 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.