European Integration and the War in Ukraine: Just Another Crisis?

After the sovereign debt, migration, Brexit and pandemic crises (to name but a few), the European Union (EU) again faces a crisis of – as yet – unknown proportions. Putin's war of aggression against Ukraine violates every principle of the European security order that emerged with the end of the Cold War. It also contests the liberal model for organizing societies the EU and its member states have been built around. Amidst these profound challenges the German Chancellor Olav Scholz referred to as ‘Zeitenwende’, politicians and pundits alike call for the deepening of European integration to defend the EU as a liberal integration project. Institutional reforms are deemed indispensable to prepare the EU for the accession of the Western Balkans and Ukraine and build the EU's strategic autonomy in weathering current and future challenges, geopolitical and otherwise. The sovereign debt, mass migration, rule-of-law backsliding and the Covid-19 pandemic have revealed the EU's weakness as a regulatory polity in coping with non-military transboundary crises. Military security pressures might do what the previous crises failed to do – finally push the member states to build up the EU's fiscal and coercive power turning it into United States of Europe. Even if the treaty reforms necessary for remedial capacity-building were on the cards in the foreseeable future, EU research does not necessarily support the expectation that conferring more power to the EU produces more power of the EU. The problem of the EU's wanting actorness does not lie so much in the weakness of its fiscal and coercive power nor in its decision-making rules and procedures. It is the member states – in the East and the West – prioritizing their national self-interests over realizing shared goals. The Ukraine crisis is a case in point. Despite the persistence of intergovernmental institutions in foreign and security policy, the member states have been remarkably united in supporting Ukraine against Russia's war of aggression. As in previous crises, the EU has been coping with its first military security crisis by using its regulatory power to facilitate the joint exercise of fiscal and coercive power by the member states. Yet, the outcome of this crisis differs. It has not resulted in a strengthening of the EU's regulatory powers as we have seen it in the Euro crisis. Unlike in the Covid-19 crisis, the member states have not been willing to give the EU more fiscal power to finance the financial assistance for Ukraine either. At the same time, intergovernmental co-operation has not been deadlocked by member states' refusal of solidarity that has derailed joint decision-making in the Schengen crisis. In our previous work on the EU's multiple crises, Thomas Risse and I argued that changes in the EU's identity politics account for the differing outcomes of the Euro and the Schengen crises (Börzel and Risse 2018). In this article, I explore the extent to which the political mobilization of particular identity constructions related to questions of order rather than borders in framing the Ukraine crisis can help explain why member states have upgraded their common interest in supporting Ukraine without granting the EU additional power. The article starts by conceptualizing supranational institutions and member state solidarity as two separate dimensions of deepening European integration. It then develops an argument that links deepening European integration to identity politics. To empirically illustrate the argument, I analyze the outcome of the EU's Ukraine crisis and compare it to previous crises. The comparison reveals that the member states have been willing to upgrade their common interests without pooling or delegating additional powers though. This outcome differs from the Euro, the Schengen and the Covid-19 crises, in which member state solidarity went hand in hand with a strengthening of supranational institutions – with the exception of the Schengen crisis, which resulted in neither. Mainstream theories of European integration may explain the absence of institutional reform in the Ukraine crisis by insufficient functional pressure to outweigh the high sovereignty costs involved in granting the EU coercive power. It is less obvious, however, how they would account for the willingness of member state governments to unite in their support for Ukraine in the absence of such pressure. The second part of the article therefore discusses whether the explanation for this peculiar outcome can be found in the identity politics involved in Putin's war against Ukraine. Unlike Schengen and similar to Euro and Covid-19, the upgrading of the common interest even by right-wing populist governments has been facilitated by the war being framed in terms of order (who are we) rather than border (who belongs to us). The identity discourse about what community the EU wants to be fostered solidarity amongst the member states in coping with the Covid-19 pandemic, and in the same way, it is generating solidarity with Ukraine in defending its independent nationhood against Russia, including the granting of accession prospects. EU membership, of course, also relates to issues of borders and belonging; questions of order and border intersect, particularly since EU accession is conditional upon the commitment to and compliance with the EU liberal principles for organizing politics and society. Being a European neighbor, Ukraine qualifies for EU membership. Geographic and cultural proximity also accounts for the willingness of Poland to receive millions of Ukrainians. The article concludes by discussing why the identity discourse enabling a far-reaching upgrading of the common interest on security and defense issues has not resulted in a strengthening of supranational institutions. There are different ways to conceptualize and measure the deepening of European integration. EU scholars tend to focus on the institutional dimension. Regional integration involves the ‘delegation and pooling’ of national sovereignty rights (Hooghe and Marks 2015). ‘Delegation’ (‘level’, or ‘breadth’ of integration) refers to the number of policy sectors in which states are willing to share or transfer national competencies to the European level; ‘pooling’ (‘scope’, or ‘depth’) denotes the power and autonomy of regional authorities in exercising these competencies (Börzel 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2015; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). The breadth of EU competencies is quite comprehensive. There are very few areas in which the EU is unable to take action. The issue is how much control member states still hold over EU policy-making. This varies considerably across and within policy areas,1 depending on the ‘governance mix’. The power of individual member states, and hence the need for upgrading the common interest, increases from intergovernmental co-ordination, which requires unanimity (e.g., security and defense), over joint decision-making by majority voting (e.g., asylum and migration) to supranational delegation (e.g., monetary member states are not involved what particular for the of by of the common rather than on the of the common or the the of and the powers of supranational institutions as two dimensions of political which were in their so as to work a a which the of the or The that links the two is that of the common interests on the of an with an of The that supranational institutions the upgrading of the common interest amongst member states is in the of EU scholars and alike for majority on issues of security and defense to the EU's to as and the Yet, the Schengen crisis has how on the member states, on the and the support for populist on the can in a on political (Börzel and Risse Hooghe and Marks EU competencies and majority voting have not been to member states upgrade the common interest in to terms with mass into the EU. member states have to the by to with EU for to (Börzel At the same time, the war in Ukraine that the EU is to as even The EU has been so united on foreign and security policy This is not to that supranational institutions have in by upgrading the common states have the powers of supranational institutions to to upgrade the common interest, in a deepening of integration (Börzel the strengthening of supranational institutions requires an upgrading of the common interest by the member states. have to give up national sovereignty to common supranational institutions. There to however, that and the policy of joint decision-making and supranational delegation to the European and the on institutional reforms to common goals. The willingness and of member states to on and with EU on the costs they have to The the the more member state governments are to against EU particularly if are and about (Börzel the deepening of European the EU has (Hooghe and Marks and and or support EU rather than being or is a (Hooghe and Marks or even of deepening European integration. political in and changes the of European integration political can control of in national and on EU the for by national governments and European for functional to The from interest politics to mass politics hand in hand with a of a that is cultural rather than and relates to identity and community (Hooghe and Marks 2018). The cultural has been referred to as liberal as or as Marks It political issues such as cultural and Thomas Risse and I argued that the cultural the with is to their national (Börzel and Risse Risse the political mobilization of can ways with to the deepening of European integration. solidarity with member states as as support for European integration have the The of with to border and community by political member states from upgrading the common The is the case political are framed in terms of questions of that what as a community and how much solidarity of the community to which empirically our by the Euro and the Schengen crises (Börzel and Risse 2018). The Covid-19 crisis our argument that identity politics issues of order are more to deepening integration on dimensions The outcome of the Ukraine crisis is more to as it involves an upgrading of common interest without supranational institutions. still from the Covid-19 pandemic Russia's military of Ukraine in the crisis or rather of crises. It is not the first war on the European since the end of the War. are EU member states to the It therefore may be to what extent Ukraine war the EU's first military in of and Putin's war to the European security order as it emerged from the Cold War. not its liberal as they were in the of which to rights and the of as the the future of their The war of aggression also violates the principles of sovereign and in the part of the order that has been by liberal and states Putin's of and and challenges the that to the foreign of European and Western states that and and This is why German Chancellor Olav Scholz for a turning in foreign policy, with for the for a deepening of the EU majority voting in the have been by European (e.g., and by (e.g., the EU has an to take against the of by Putin's The EU member states have – – on than on military and to the and on in and military The member states have also and have to more than the EU of state and with to future security to which help Ukraine defend in the of aggression and This is the first that EU member states have such a security commitment to a The of the member states' is the more the of of on from and the of to with Putin's of the joint but security and defense a case for member states upgrading the common interest, so does EU different member states for the EU (e.g., the and or on accession for current related to their national interests (e.g., and The EU's in the member states to and The member states have on a of joint with and of and At the same time, they have from the EU more fiscal and coercive power or the decision-making rules and on security and defense The member states a commitment in EU sovereignty in the of and rather than state powers the EU they have their national fiscal and and by EU institutions The to the fiscal of to finance the EU to help member states from the of the Covid-19 pandemic by the German Chancellor Scholz the EU it as the EU's still of in and the to the in not in for its and have the member states to build military to their security commitment to Ukraine without to on the United Despite for more majority voting on security and defense which would the EU to the of member states and as a to its strategic the intergovernmental institutions of the and have In the EU's of the Ukraine crisis has involved a of upgrading of the common interest – however, in institutional deepening of European integration as we have seen it in the Euro and the Covid-19 crisis. To the of the the Euro a of supranational institutions a more The the European the the and the European a far-reaching institutional deepening of European integration. do the reforms in to the Covid-19 pandemic and The member states the of the for a European Union the of the EU in the of also the powers of the European and the European for and and the and EU for with and the to the joint of and to an and the amongst national To the of the pandemic, the of the and a pandemic in the European and a to in an to member states to finance The European additional to and the EU and the financial in for the the member states have on To help the for the member states have the to on of the EU on the the first time, the member states in Unlike Euro member states be To the joint the EU receive in of a on a on a border a financial and an of the EU to the and member states for the first to the of EU conditional on a member of the of not to the of the EU's in of the on European Union the rule-of-law be the financial interests of the Union are This of control requires independent the member states on a European to the Covid-19 crisis, strengthening the EU's powers in policy, and to national to support the and of particularly in the member states by the crisis. the the power to and may not a but they are in the EU to a – even the member states not to the EU a fiscal of and have on ways of the to support Ukraine. The to EU the of to be more to in and Poland than which member state governments have been to and The outcome of the Covid-19 crisis by a upgrading of the common interest that involved not financial amongst member states but also the of a EU of common EU and the with the policy as the for solidarity with the the Euro crisis. in the Covid-19 crisis has been but this on the of the of and the Ukraine crisis has not seen of the institutional deepening of the Euro and the Covid-19 crises, it still differs from the Schengen crisis, which has been a the of the EU in to terms with the not related to the of member states to take joint action. the end of and the end of the member states on a of joint the of the European Union for the the of the on the and future on the by on the EU's for a common asylum and for to support member states and in and the of a common of of the of in need of and the of additional in and however, the member states failed to upgrade the common interest as they to of the joint not their nor they the of additional to or the European a of the were from and of upgrading the common interest, governments national border (Börzel to reform the European to a of for and in need of and are not to their or they are have failed so The by the on and in on two asylum and by a majority of of member The asylum would the EU's borders of or with of being would not be to the EU would also be more The strengthening of border is the common in the reform of the European The second part of the reform would the which the states for the of asylum as the member states of first To a and of for across member states, the asylum and which member state for the of an asylum The member states would be a of a number of or into a joint EU however, requires an upgrading of the common interest particularly by and European they are to which against the two with in the and to of and asylum nor the an upgrading of the common interest in supporting Ukraine but institutional reforms of the intergovernmental and the Ukraine crisis the Euro and Covid-19 crisis with their deepening of European on the and the Schengen crisis as a on on the To what extent can identity politics account for this outcome of the Ukraine theories of European such as liberal or for the outcome of of the EU's multiple crises the in and Hooghe and Marks and across the crises more of a particularly with the Ukraine crisis a of member state governments to the Euro and the Covid-19 crisis, deepening European they failed to do so in the case of the Schengen crisis, a common interest in the Schengen to have they been to their over however, delegating more fiscal and military powers to supranational institutions or enabling more majority voting on security and defense To the and to for member state governments to more power to the EU and the of costs not to do so of on common member state for the of the common the Schengen and security The to which member state governments have been willing to and sovereignty the EU is then by the of costs and the power of states and supranational in costs supranational delegation would that member state to the fiscal and coercive powers of the EU in security and defense to with the Ukraine crisis are as are more by Russia, to their than the has for the necessary military to the EU and and the EU can for of the EU to finance its support for Ukraine. why have the member states from sovereignty costs to the EU's strategic autonomy but on against that resulted in and political costs to the crisis and which are as amongst the member states as the security by This is may in to the of its on the the Euro and the Schengen as as its on Russia, has high costs in crises. In the Euro and the Covid-19 crisis, German in with in about institutional reforms and Despite the of failed to joint by the member states in coping with the mass of in for a more sovereign Europe. Yet, rather than European has national if not the of an and against or the of to Ukraine and to a the why failed in its in the Schengen crisis and from over in the Ukraine crisis. has been in crises and The European fostered amongst the member states on the strengthening of supranational institutions in the Euro and the Covid-19 crisis and 2015). of its for the supranational European in have failed so and The has a in the member state to Russia's war of including the the assistance and the and At the same time, it has not to the intergovernmental institutions in security and as a for deepening integration (Hooghe and Marks 2018). The and the by populist particularly on the explain why the member states failed to upgrade their common interests in the Schengen crisis. why were member state governments and the EU to their on deepening integration the Euro and the Covid-19 crises, and joint against Russia, from the of that to defend sovereignty against supranational and with of the in identity politics. the Euro and Covid-19 crisis, identity politics of the EU. much solidarity is in a political community to it and what do of the community to in terms of and to the In the political and identity of the EU to questions of its political and order rather than its In the Euro crisis, the issue solidarity as the member states argued that the European crisis their and solidarity if they with the rules of the Euro (Börzel and Risse The identity discourse the crisis to and The the and the questions of whether the of and in the been The issue how much solidarity the their for the of the on what of political community the EU to be rather than on to it the governments of to solidarity for the fiscal necessary to the the Euro and Risse In the Covid-19 crisis, member states were by the were than but without the and At the member states to a and and of and rather than in joint the EU After a of however, the on over a and by the EU and its member states to the to the Euro crisis, the deepening of integration on the solidarity of the majority of European by their that European including German Chancellor and for solidarity to areas of the Union by Covid-19 and The governments up on their against the of and on fiscal as a for solidarity and The and governments the of as a for EU and The is the more as the two rule-of-law less to from the of the than the European Euro which were the by the The by the and the rule-of-law were facilitated by and by and the supranational of the European and similar to the Euro crisis, the discourse of European solidarity in coping with a transboundary and its the upgrading of the common interest amongst member state The of and that support for EU fiscal in to the Covid-19 crisis with and support for European integration rather than and such as the costs by the pandemic or from EU and state governments were not by the mobilization of right-wing populist that from turning the of the national to the pandemic and their on the and individual rights against the strengthening of the EU's fiscal and related powers and and The Schengen crisis and the about and were about about we and belongs to The is not about questions of order but about borders and It about a and against an which Risse The of Poland its of the two reform that it would to on by in the European on on and reform the EU as of European The of borders and by right-wing populist and the majority and in the absence of a and by the European (Börzel and Risse The border identity discourse member state governments in upgrading the common interest, in to exercise in European in particular The and European have framed the Ukraine crisis as a and war of aggression by Russia, which not the security order but also contests liberal the Russia's of to a and sovereignty and in which is being into our and an for to a of EU in of the Union that has in with Ukraine Putin's war a war by against but also a on our a war on our a war on our and a war on our This is about against In in German Chancellor Scholz that and support for Ukraine as in and to European share our of and that a turning and the of European of and in the of the of Ukraine. are not for their they have also been for the of The of Ukraine would be the of the of the military to which is with that are defending the of and on which our is and the very of The identity discourse about the that as a community and that are in Ukraine with for its to national to the defense of and the of and that unite Even refers to European in of the military as the to and our not against and by the but also against of the United States and its are by as as our and on their that would our from the The mobilization of shared European has support in member states for the against Russia, and military for Ukraine as as of It also the majority of that community that solidarity to they share and defend these membership. In the EU's Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine a of crisis which has not resulted in integration as we have seen it in the Euro and Covid-19 crisis, but does not an as in the case of the Schengen crisis. have this outcome as the member states rather than more the EU or without The article a that upgrading of the common interest and institutional reform as two dimensions of deepening integration. security and defense is a case for member state governments have been to their national in to Russia's military of which a more of the EU to Russia's of the in of European integration have in for this of crisis particularly in comparison to previous identity politics can help the it to explain why the framing of the war as a for the that the EU as a political community has an upgrading of the common interest but of the and The identity discourse has a of the EU's joint costs by the crisis and Despite for strengthening the EU's strategic member state governments have from majority voting and the EU more fiscal and coercive power. The that the deepening of integration in to a transboundary crisis, military or on functional and also and are As to the or the and of a crisis pressure and also a for realizing to a of and The of and interests within and across member states, and of community and At the same time, crises member states with their and which their to on common or to and to EU to the of integration by upgrading the common interest can in or 1970). This the more mass and identity politics pressure on the and of (Hooghe and Marks The integration is the of functional pressure by and political support facilitated by an identity are necessary and for deepening integration. In the Ukraine crisis, the identity discourse the necessary for upgrading the common Yet, the functional pressure not to reforms as it and and In the absence of a against the EU and its member states, the security has been and the member states and Ukraine can on the by the of the EU member states to in joint security and defense to their military Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is crisis or a on whether member state governments that national sovereignty as a for and in the EU that the to and security in is rather than the Ukraine crisis has to refusal of in and within the EU. have of a Schengen issues of identity constructions are to to the upgrading of the common interest necessary to in the EU's supranational of asylum and I to and for their and for this article part of the of of the by the German – – and by