Civilian militia formation and protection against rebel violence: Evidence from Nigeria

Why do some civilian defense militias effectively protect civilians while others fail and seem to only exacerbate rebel violence against civilians? Many irregular civil wars involve civilian defense militias, i.e., informal civilian groups that cooperate with the state military to protect their communities. Despite a burgeoning literature on militias in civil wars, research on variation in militia emergence and protective effects remains limited. Drawing on field research in northeastern Nigeria's Boko Haram conflict, we explain how local variation in militia formation shapes militias' protective effects against rebel violence. We argue that when repressive conflict conditions in state-dominated areas create incentives for civilian violent resistance, a community's collective action capacity, defined by local leadership and social cohesion, determines whether militias are community-initiated or imposed by state forces. Communities with high-capacity form community-initiated militias and maintain social control over their activities, which enables militias to effectively protect civilians against rebel violence. By contrast, communities with low capacity often host state-initiated militias and struggle to establish social control over their members, which renders them ineffective against rebels. Our findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of civilian protective agency by showing that the capacities enabling neutrality and nonviolent resistance can also empower communities to form militias that effectively resist rebel violence.