ABSTRACT We argue that the forensic concept of “dangerousness” should be expanded to protect non‐human animals when danger is readily foreseeable and before it materializes into substantial harm. The criminal justice approach is limited in this respect because it relies on cruelty statutes that are largely reactive, embodying the adage that “some must suffer first” before intervention can occur. We demonstrate that dangerousness principles and/or language are already embedded—often implicitly and sometimes explicitly—in at least five areas of animal law. We highlight the well‐accepted “grave disability” criteria used in assessing dangerousness to self because of the parallels to the deficits noted in animal hoarding, with the main difference being the absence or presence of animals. A civil approach focused on forfeiture (and when appropriate, mental health intervention) rather than prosecution could help bridge the gap between the care animals deserve and the deficiencies that criminal law will currently tolerate.
Patronek et al. (Tue,) studied this question.