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The assumption that Russia’s foreign policy is “nationalist,” advanced as the main explanation to understand the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, needs to be questioned. First it is almost impossible to identify a “nationalist school” that would have shaped Russia’s foreign policy decisions. Only one nationalist storyline has gone from being marginal in the early 1990s to becoming part of state policy in the 2000s, namely that of compatriots, under the argument of “Russia as a divided nation.” This is the only case where we can trace the influence of a nationalist group with clearly identifiable figures and lobbying structures; however, the nationalist content has been neutralized in the process of cooptation by state organs. This article argues that even in the context of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014, which has partly changed previously established interactions between nationalism and Russia’s foreign policy, Russia may use a nationalist post hoc explanation but does not advance a nationalist agenda.
Marlène Laruelle (Wed,) studied this question.