Progress and ongoing conceptual challenges “on the way to integrative human neuroscience”–ten years after

Ten years ago, we published a position paper in this journal, criticizing reductionist claims of neurobiology related to mental disorders and important theoretical concepts like free will. Our interdisciplinary group of experts highlighted the need for and the challenges of integrating different approaches and system levels in neuroscience. We argued—and still argue—that such an integrative and multi-perspective approach is an important precondition for progress in the understanding and treatment of neuro-psychiatric disorders. We now review the progress towards an integrative neuroscience during the past decade in five steps: First, we examine the social and institutional context of brain research that has enabled tremendous technical developments and insights. Nevertheless, many research programs remain reductionist and fail to acknowledge differences between different system levels, their complex interactions, and domain-specific languages. We argue that scientific discourse largely lacks any critical account on the very nature of neurobiological explanations and interdisciplinary interfaces. Second, these conceptual weaknesses lead us to highlight the need for establishing an interdisciplinary neurophilosophy which tackles the challenging multiplicity of perspectives and approaches in modern neurosciences. The task is not just a collaboration between philosophers and neuroscientists, but rather the development of a critical philosophical stance within the neurosciences themselves. Third, based on this, we plead for the importance of the emerging science of complex systems, which is particularly helpful to integrate interdisciplinary knowledge and develop new strategies for modeling multi-level relations and phenomena. We suggest the application of systemic approaches in the mind sciences. Fourth, in line with this holistic view, we present an ecological perspective on human beings. The still dominating cephalocentric paradigm in neurosciences is severely limited without understanding the brain as a regulative organ in a situated organism and—in case of humans—an acting person “extended” to tools, technologies, and social structures. Fifth, in our final section, we illustrate our view using the debate about free will. We argue that any position respecting the complexity and irreducibility of mental phenomena will escape inappropriate reductionist and deterministic assumptions while fully acknowledging scientific evidence. We conclude with the demand for stronger efforts towards an institutionalized, interdisciplinary, systems-oriented neurophilosophy.