The Frustrations of Geopolitics and the Pleasures of War:Behind Enemy Linesand American Geopolitical Culture

This paper considers the film Behind Enemy Lines, made before 11th September 2001 but rush released soon after, as a cultural and commercial product which provides insights into American geopolitical culture. It argues that the movie's storyline is an articulation of a Jacksonian tradition in American geopolitical culture involving a drama of remasculinization. It also argues that the film is a mythic rendition of morally ambiguous American military engagement with the Bosnian war. Finally, it examines the film as an expression of the structure of feeling of post-9/11 American militarism. That structure of feeling is characterized by impatience with the pragmatics of multilateral diplomacy, and strong desire for the pleasures of the unilateral action and morally righteous violence. Acknowledgements I want to thank the anonymous reviewers of this paper for taking the time to provide detailed and constructive comments. Thanks also to the participants in the National Science Foundation ‘Southern Tier States’ workshop in Portoroz, Slovenia, June 2004 for their feedback when this paper was presented. Notes The original release date of the movie was January 2002. In a tie-in with the movie, featuring ads and excerpts for its production, the Discovery Channel re-broadcast a BBC documentary about O'Grady two days before its release with the new title ‘Behind Enemy Lines: The Scott O'Grady Story’. This action was the subject of a law suit by O'Grady in 2003. The budget figures are from ‘Producers Commentary’ on the DVD release of Behind Enemy Linesand from the web sites and. In his DVD commentary, Davis notes that the film would not have been made if it were not for these retired military pilots who believed that the film must be made and encouraged him to ‘keep at it’ until Department of Defense cooperation was secured. The ‘adolescent male’ demographic is actually more complex than the label suggests. It comprises an audience of youth and adults, males and females, who enjoy stories of masculine crisis, recovery and redemptive re-masculinisation. The imperiled phallocentric order is restored. The film's gendered narrative arc embodies the culture of American masculinity crisis/renewal described by James William Gibson, Warrior Dreams: Violence and Manhood in Post-Vietnam America (New York: Hill and Wang 1994) and others. The initial script was largely scrapped because Moore thought it was ‘garbage’: ‘all the bad guys were Chetniks with long fur coats and curved knives. I got rid of all that and made them very complex people with cell phones. ’ John Moore, ‘Behind Behind Enemy Lines: Press Conference’, , 2001. Film plot summary, available at the film's official web site, accessed 28 October 2004. The movie is full of commercial features and product placements, from a lingering shot of Hackman's character smoking a cigarette to a bottle of Coca-Cola as a cure for thirst to Northrop Grumman satellite and weapons systems. The most ostentatious product placement of all is the use of News Corp's Sky News and one of its senior reporters as the vehicle for news in the movie, even to the extent of having Sky News broadcasting in America. On the military–industrial–entertainment complex see James Der Derian, Virtuous War (Boulder, CO: Westview 2001). David Campbell notes that the story of O'Grady ‘behind enemy lines’ is reminiscent of captive narratives in American history (colonists in the hands of Indians, for example). See David Campbell, ‘Contraditions of a Lone Superpower’, in David Slater and Peter Taylor (eds), The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power (Oxford: Blackwell 1999) pp. 222–40. Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How it Changed the World (New York: Routledge, 2002). I should point out that my terminology is different from that used by Mead. What he terms ‘the American foreign policy tradition’ I term American geopolitical culture and what he terms as ‘paradigms’ and ‘schools’ I term ‘traditions’. It is outlined and defended in Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of Geopolitics’, in Lasha Tchantouridze (ed. ), Geopolitical Perspectives on World Politics (Winnipeg: Centre for Defence and Security Studies 2003). US foreign policy is not made up exclusively of any one of these traditions and I do not mean to imply that by focusing in this essay on the Jacksonian story line. To view the image go to accessed 29 October 2004. It has also elements in common with post-Cold War remasculinising fables like Independence Day. See Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge 2001). Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1989) p. 73. Jeffords acknowledges how these films tie into what she calls ‘other kinds of social thematics currently in operation in American culture: among others militarism, patriotism, individualism, and recuperation of America's international image’ (ibid. p. 135). Ibid. p. 5. On American ‘patriot’ discourse see Carolyn Gallaher, On the Fault Line: Race, Class and the American Patriot Movement (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2003) and Mathew Sparke, ‘Outsides Inside Patriotism: The Oklahoma Bombing and the Displacement of Heartland Geopolitics’, in Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (eds), Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998) pp. 198–223. This reference to ‘women’ is purely gestural. There are no women characters in Behind Enemy Lines. There are only two brief lines spoken by women throughout the whole movie, one by a member of the USS Carl Vinson crew and another by a Bosniak. The male-only nature of this tradition has changed over the last two decades as its violent misogynist masculinity has been exposed, and previously all-male military institutions have been forced to admit women recruits. The US Department of Defense denies it produces ‘propaganda films’ and will point out that private film producers, rather than the department, make films like Behind Enemy Lines. Furthermore, film makers are free to produce any kind of film they so wish. However, few films secure the cooperation of the US Department of Defense. The DoD will not cooperate with any film makers without approval of their script beforehand. Obtaining approval is very difficult and requires film makers to hire influential retired military officials and, if possible, also have powerful political influence. Once approval is obtained, film makers are required to work with scripts acceptable to the military. Particular scenes and images are vetoed if they do not meet with the approval of the military. In Behind Enemy Lines a scene where Reigart picks up the phone and calls Sky News to leak the story of the downed pilot was vetoed as it showed a US Navy commander deliberately breaking the ‘chain of command’. Instead, Reigart is shown picking up a Sky News reporter's business card. The next scene shows the breaking of the story on Sky News. Yet, interestingly, the American Navy were fine with the overall story which celebrates American unilateralism and the renegade actions of a commander. For a discussion of the process of cooperating with the US military in the making of a film, see the writer's commentary on the DVD of Tears of the Sun (Sony Pictures, 2003). David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace (New York: Scribner 2001) p. 46. Colin Powell, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine 1995) p. 559. Halberstam (note 17) pp. 38–9. Powell, My American Journey (note 18) p. 559. ‘Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out of age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being spilled over century-old feuds. The lines between enemies and even friends are jumbled and fragmented. Let no one think there is an easy or a simple solution to this tragedy. The violence will not end overnight, whatever pressure and means the international community brings to bear. Blood feuds are very difficult to resolve. ’ George H. W. Bush, ‘Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters on Departure from Colorado Springs, 6 August 1992’, Public Papers of the Presidents: George Bush (US Government Printing Office 1992). David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West (New York: Simon and Schuster 1995) p. 160 and Roy Gutman, A Witness to Genocide (New York: Macmillan 1993) p. 13. This phrase and argument was first used by British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and subsequently ad nauseam by Prime Minister Major in defence of the one-sided arms embargo. See Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin 2001) p. 80. The New York Times editorialised: ‘The war in Bosnia is not a fair fight. It is not war. It is slaughter. Yet American officials, despairing of a way to end the war, continue to dither. They remain oddly unwilling to acknowledge that even if collective military intervention cannot readily compel a cease-fire, it can at least slow the slaughter. ’ ‘Editorial: At Least Slow the Slaughter’, New York Times, 4 October 1992, p. D16. Colin Powell records in his memoirs how, when he read this editorial, he ‘exploded’ and ‘dashed off a blistering response’. It was published as an op-ed piece four days later. Powell, My American Journey (note 18) pp. 558–9. Michael Gordon, ‘Bush Backs a Ban on Combat Flights into Bosnian Airspace’, New York Times, 2 October 1992, p. A1. John Goshko, ‘Bush Urges Flight Ban over Bosnia’, Washington Post, 3 October 1992, p. A1. William Schmidt, ‘Britain Wary of Using US Air Power in Bosnia’, New York Times, 5 October 1992, p. A13. Colin Powell, ‘Why Generals Get Nervous’, New York Times, 8 October 1992, p. A35. This reasoning was one of the biggest military blunders Powell made during his time as chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The war, of course, was ended three years later when limited military force was used by the United States and its allies. Paul Lewis, ‘UN Bans Flights in Bosnia but is Silent on Enforcement’, New York Times, 10 October 1992, p. A3. Elaine Sciolino, ‘US May Seek the Use of Force to Stop Serb Flights over Bosnia’, New York Times, 4 December 1992, p. A1. Media reports at the time of the ban stated that there was only one confirmed combat violation of the ban. However, other media reports indicated that the Serbs used aircraft to bomb Sarajevo as well as towns and small villages in eastern Bosnia like Osatica (south of Srebrenica on the Serbian border). Julia Preston, ‘UN Ready to Enforce Flight Ban in Bosnia’, Chicago Sun Times, 19 March 1993, p. 40; Paul Lewis, ‘UN Moving to Toughen Yugoslav Flight Ban’, New York Times, 19 March 1993, p. A11. Paul Lewis, ‘UN Approves Plan to Enforce Bosnia Flight Ban’, New York Times, 1 April 1993, p. A12. Alan Riding, ‘NATO Agrees to Enforce Flight Ban over Bosnia Ordered by UN’, New York Times, 3 April 1993, p. A5. John Pomfret, ‘NATO Jets Bomb Serb Airfield’, New York Times, 22 November 1994, p. A1. Mary Pat Kelly, ‘Good to Go’: The Rescue of Capt. Scott O'Grady, USAF, from Bosnia (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1996) p. 11. Michael Ryan gives the figure of twenty SAMs being fired at NATO aircraft from November. Most were portable shoulder propelled SA-7 (‘man-pads’) that were generally not very threatening. A few were SA-6s which were launched from vehicles and could deliver up to three radar-guided surface-to-air missiles with much bigger payloads. The rules of engagement stated that NATO aircraft could go after a SAM site immediately and only if it was a ‘smoking gun. ’ They were not allowed to take out all possible SAM sites and radar facilities. Kelly (note 35) p. 15. Ibid. p. 16. Though O'Grady did very little beyond stay out of sight, publishers still managed to generate two books about his adventure: Scott O'Grady, Return with Honor (New York: Doubleday 1995) ; and a book for children: Scott O'Grady, Basher Five-Two (New York: Yearling 1997). O'Grady left the active military after his adventure and moved to Plano, Texas where he began bible study at Dallas Theological Seminary. He established a career as a motivational speaker for Christian audiences, commanding up to 15, 000 a speech. His speeches are paeans to God, family and country. For a video excerpt see, accessed 10 November 2004. O'Grady was also active in the second presidential campaign of George W. Bush, condemning John Kerry's actions during the Vietnam War as ‘treason’. See Minnesota Public Radio, ‘O'Grady: Kerry's Actions after Vietnam Constituted Treason’, available at, accessed 10 November 2004. Kelly (note 35) p. 31. Ibid. pp. 170–71. Ibid. p. 294. In a press conference at the release of the film, director Moore denied any connection to the O'Grady story beyond the fact that it is about an American aviator shot down in Bosnia. ‘We certainly didn't approach Captain O'Grady to make his life story. I never met Captain O'Grady and I never researched material on him. ’ One significant difference between the film and O'Grady's story is the absence of religious discourse in the film. O'Grady interpreted his rescue in evangelical Christian terms: ‘God veiled me from them’; ‘my precious child, I would never leave you’; ‘if it wasn't for God's love and my love of God, I wouldn't have got through it. He's the one that delivered me here’; O'Grady (note 39) pp. 89, 105, 186. So also did some members of the military: ‘The Lord was watching over Captain O'Grady, and eventually he was watching over the Marines and sailors when we went into a combat situation’; Kelly (note 35) pp. 319, 325–6. Kelly's account of the rescue begins with the biblical quotation: ‘Who among you, if he has one hundred sheep, and loses one, will not leave the ninety-nine to follow the lost one? And when he finds it, he puts it over his shoulder and carries it home in jubilation’ (Luke 15: 4–5). In August 2002, O'Grady filed a law suit against Fox Searchlight Pictures claiming that it failed to secure the rights to his story when it made Behind Enemy Lines. He also sued the Discovery Channel for using a documentary about him as a tie-in to the movie. For example, Colonel Chuck Wald, commander of the Aviano air base in Italy, stated that ‘I'm afraid they'll fight in Bosnia until they end up fighting with spoons if they have to. Any resolution in Bosnia must come from the combatants’; Kelly (note 35 p. 48). Scott O'Grady's knowledge of the Bosnian war came from US Air Force intelligence in Aviano: ‘there were no friendly forces in Bosnia, no safe areas, no one you could count on. This was not World War II, when front lines meant something and the French Resistance harbored many an American pilot. This was modern warfare, where it seemed that the only thing united a crazy quilt of factions was a shared distrust of the U. N. peacekeepers and the NATO airpower behind them’; O'Grady (note 39) p. 43. This is the only comment on the Bosnian war in his memoir. David Campbell reads the willingness of the US military to deploy a substantial force to save one man, in contrast to its reluctance to deploy any forces to respond to the deaths of more than 200, 000 Bosnians, as exemplary of the contradictions of the United States’ engagement with the post-Cold War world. The US military, like most militaries, is a bureaucracy with a strong line between insiders and outsiders. Given the role of Christianity in also determining that line for many, identifying with Muslims may have been difficult. In his Bosnia memoir Richard Holbrooke recalls that Leighton Smith personally did not agree with NATO bombing in Bosnia and told him, echoing James Baker, that he did not have a ‘dog in this fight’. In Holbrooke's view ‘Smith was edging into an area of political judgments that should have been reserved for civilian leaders’; Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House 1998) p. 118. Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1999). Holbrooke (note 46) pp 335–7. One of the interesting features of the US deployment in Bosnia is how ending it became a cause célèbre in right-wing military circles in the United States. For years, Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson spoke out against the deployment in the US Senate and sponsored legislation to withdraw the troops. George W. Bush also called for US troops to be withdrawn from Bosnia when he was running for president. Why this was the case is puzzling but it appears that many Capitol Hill Republicans never accepted that Bosnia or later Kosovo was worth US involvement. The wars there were seen as Clinton/Albright ‘peacekeeping’ wars. That they were on behalf of Muslims may account for the opposition of some. The Balkan deployments supposedly symbolised a ‘readiness’ problem in the US military. It was needed for war fighting in ‘defence of the nation’, not foreign policy ‘social work’ like peacekeeping. Furthermore, those making these arguments held that there was no US national interest in the Balkans because there was no oil there or anywhere nearby. The views of US military commanders after the Bosnian war contradict these positions. One report found unanimous agreement that US peace operations like Bosnia strengthened US leadership and did not comprise war-fighting ability. In fact, the highest reenlistment in the army was from soldiers serving in Bosnia. See Edith Wilkie and Beth DeGrasse, A Force for Peace: US Commanders’ Views of the Military's Role in Peace Operations A Project of the Peace Through Law Education Fund 1999, available at accessed 10 November 2004. Sherri Sylvester, ‘Hackman, Wilson hit the (Ship) Deck for “Enemy Lines”’, CNN Showbiz Today Reports, 28 November 2001. ‘Producer Commentary’ on the DVD of Behind Enemy Lines and ‘Production Notes’ on the official film website See notes 13 and 14. On the importance of gear in the new militarism see Thomas de Zengotita, ‘The Romance of Empire and the Politics of Self-Love’, Harpers Monthly (2003) pp. 31–9. Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso 2003). For a critique of this threat inflation from a military strategic point of view see Jeffrey Record, ‘Bounding the Global War on Terrorism’, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, available at, accessed 21 January 2004. Kevin Baker, ‘we're in the Army Now: The G. O. P. 's Plan to Militarize Our Culture’, Harper's Magazine (2003) pp. 35-46. Mann (note 53) George W. Bush, of the January available at accessed 21 January 2004. the 2004 presidential campaign George W. 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