The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise

The first part of this paper is a theoretical discussion of some of the problems facing intelligence communities and decision makers in their efforts to guard against a surprise attack. These difficulties are examined in the light of three “noise levels” (three environmental background noises), as well as in relation to the complexities involved in the mutual evaluation of intentions and capabilities of opposing sides. The author's pessimistic conclusions regarding the possibilities of preventing a surprise attack are summarized by five intelligence paradoxes (or contradictions), three of which appear in the theoretical section and the other two in the case study of the Yom Kippur War. The second part of this article is a case study of the conditions and perceptions of Israeli decision makers which made surprise inevitable at the outbreak of the war. The conclusion is a summary of the lessons which, even if they cannot provide a foolproof guarantee against surprise, can dampen the effects of a surprise attack and supply decision makers with some guidelines for improving their alertness and readiness to face surprise.