AUTHORS' RESPONSES: Clearing Up Some Misconceptions About the Quad Model

Psychological Inquiry 2006. Vol. I7. No. 3. 269-276 Copyright @ 2006 by Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Inc. Clearing Up Some Misconceptions About the Quad Model Jeffrey W. Sherman University of California, Davis I thank the authors of the commentaries for giving their time to think about whatl wrote and for providing some very thoughtful views on the Quad Model. It is an impressive collection of respondents, and I found the commentaries to be constructive, well reasoned, and thought—provoking. My goal in this response is to try to clarify some misconceptions about the Quad Model that appeared among the commentaries. The fact that some of these issues appeared in multiple commentar- ies suggests that I failed to make certain aspects of the model clear in my original piece, and I welcome the opportunity to repair the situation. In other instances, I simply disagree with what someone wrote, and I ex- plain why. I address four broad issues: (a) assumptions about the automaticity/controllability of the processes represented in the model; (b) assumptions about the temporal sequence and relationships among the pro- cesses in the model; (c) the generality of the model, both in terms of task applicability and process identity; and (d) the bases for choosing among different process dissociation models. Assumptions About Automatieity/Controllability In their excellent analysis, Moors and De Houwer (this issue) describe a number of ways in which pro- cess models confound the categories of processes with the criteria for categorization. The Quad Model is de- scribed as a model that confounds functional processes with the conditions under which such processes can take place. In particular, the Quad Model is described as confounding the automatic versus controlled nature of a process with the identity of the process (e.g., guessing, overcoming bias). Given my description of the Quad Model, it is easy to see how these authors would mistakenly draw this conclusion, despite my ex- plicit efforts to disavow such a notion (as mentioned in Moors discrimination pro- cesses are defined by their actions of discriminating among possible responses; OB processes are defined by their actions to suppress associations or response tendencies; and G processes are defined by their ac- tions in producing response biases. In contrast, extrin- sic features refer to aspects of the processes that may vary and that are not inherent to the fundamental nature of the process. For instance, some processes may re- quire more cognitive effort, whereas others require less effort; some processes may be accompanied by con- scious awareness, whereas olhers may occur outside of conscious awareness; some processes may be elicited intentionally, whereas others are elicited unintention- ally; finally, some processes may be controllable. whereas others might be uncontrollable (Bargh. 1994). Though extrinsic features are important for under- standing the conditions that inlluenee a given process. they do not specify what exactly the process is doing, and they may or may not accompany any given intrin- sic process. In the target article I argued that it would be most appropriate for researchers to specify the intrinsic na- ture of important processes and to then examine empir-