The Left and Indonesia’s 1960s: the politics of remembering and forgetting

Abstract Abstract This article examines a pivotal decade in the recent history of Indonesian society: the 1960s. It examines the context within which the Left came to be decisively, and violently, defeated as a social and political force. It then studies the consequences of this defeat for Indonesia's subsequent historical trajectory. The article also suggests that history‐writing anywhere is nothing less than the politics of remembering (and forgetting). What is at stake in these exercises is ultimately tied up with the legitimacy of entire social orders and systems of power. Thus, in Indonesia, the trauma of 1965 and its aftermath banished, from the collective memory of Indonesians, the political role of the Left – except in the form that runs through New Order‐era discourse on Indonesian communism. For Indonesians born or raised after 1965, the 'communist treason' became, arguably, the most critical element of the grand narrative of post‐colonial Indonesian history, which was so important in legitimising New Order authoritarianism. The current inability of Indonesian society and its elites to acknowledge and confront the reality of the horrors of the 1960s might prove to be a major impediment to a more genuine and substantive democratisation process. Keywords: Leftcommunism1965Cold Warpost‐authoritarianismmemoryNew OrderSoehartolabourcapitalismIndonesiaSoutheast Asia Notes 1. According to the official narrative, the events described below took place on 30 September 1965, although they clearly took place in the early hours of the next day. The reason for the selection of the earlier date is that an Indonesian acronym for '30 September Movement' could be produced that spelled out 'Gestapu' (Gerakan September Tigapuluh) – and thus a subtle psychological connection could be made with the sinister German Gestapo. In other words the fact that the events are 'remembered' in Indonesia as having taken place on 30 September, to this day, is down to nothing more than propaganda and political convenience (see Dhakidae 2003 Dhakidae, Daniel. 2003. Cendekiawan dan Kekuasaan dalam Negara Orde Baru, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama. Google Scholar: 224–225, for a discussion). 2. On the latter question, see Anderson (1987 Anderson, Benedict. 1987. 'How did the generals die'. Indonesia, 43(April): 109–34. Google Scholar). 3. Theories produced to explain the event have varied widely. One depicts the murders as an integral part of an attempt by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to gain power by eliminating the top military brass – at that time the army in particular was regarded as the main foe of the party that had become increasingly close to the nationalist and 'Third Worldist' President Soekarno. This theory is of course the position most closely associated with the official version of events throughout the long Soeharto period, during which the PKI was demonised as both ruthless murderers and traitors to the nation (e.g. Notosusanto and Saleh 1967 Notosusanto, Nugroho and Saleh, Ismail. 1967. The Coup Attempt of the September 30th Movement in Indonesia, Jakarta: Pembimbing Massa. Google Scholar). Another theory, most famously put forward by Ben Anderson, Ruth McVey, and Frederick Bunnell, suggests that the murder of the generals was part of an internal struggle within the Indonesia military, which pitted angry junior officers and rank‐and‐file soldiers against superiors who were regarded as corrupt (Anderson et al. 1971 Anderson, Benedict, McVey, Ruth, Bunnell and Frederick. 1971. A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia Ithaca Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Publication No. 52 Google Scholar). They may have been reacting as well to rumours that a group of US‐backed generals – in a shady 'Council of Generals' – were plotting to overthrow President Soekarno. Still another well‐known explanation was advanced by W.F. Wertheim, the Dutch scholar who insists that the entire episode was part of a concerted attempt by General Soeharto, Soekarno's successor and lynchpin of the New Order (1966–1998), to rid himself of rivals within the military while simultaneously crushing the PKI and eroding Soekarno's power and authority (Wertheim 1979 Wertheim, W.F. 1979. 'Whose plot? New light on the 1965 events'. Journal of Contemporary Asia, IX(2): 197–215. Google Scholar). Dake, on the other hand, argues that it was Soekarno who had attempted a coup against his own government with the aim of ridding himself of top leaders of the military whom he believed to harbour plans against him (Dake 2006 Dake, Anthony C.A. 2006. Soekarno File: Berkas‐berkas Soekarno 1965–1967, Jakarta: Aksara Karunia. Google Scholar). 4. The exact figure will never be known; countless others were detained for long periods without trial due to alleged association with the PKI or associated mass organisations. Many were exiled to the tough island of Buru in Maluku. 5. President Abdurrahman Wahid tried to repeal the 1966 legislation that outlaws Marxism/Leninism in Indonesia. 6. These world‐views continue to be at least partially reproduced by influential young artists today. For example, in the film Gie (2005 Riza, Riri. 2005. Gie Google Scholar) – about the 1960s student activist and icon Soe Hok Gie – rising film director Riri Riza crucially includes scenes of how students heroically joined the military against the communists. This is the case even as the film, following its hero's intellectual trajectory, is critical of the corruption that emerged in the early New Order and the hypocrisy of certain student leaders. 7. Thaksin apparently views UMNO in Malaysia and PAP in Singapore as models for the Thai Rak Thai. See Pasuk (2004 Pasuk, Phongpaichit. September 2004. 'Thailand under Thaksin: Another Malaysia?' September, Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University Working Paper No. 109 Google Scholar) for details. 8. The Pancasila or Five Principles consist of Belief in One God; Humanitarianism; Indonesian Unity; Consultative Democracy; and Social Justice. 9. In New‐Order‐speak, one had to be bersih lingkungan (from a 'clean environment'). 10. For example, interview with Sudomo, former security chief and Minister of Manpower during the Soeharto era, 9 May 1994. 11. These novels are known collectively as the Buru tetralogy because the four novels of which it consists were written under extremely difficult circumstances while the author was in exile on the remote and harsh island of Buru. 12. See Tabloid Pembebasan (2003 Pembebasan, Tabloid. 2003. Haji Misbach: Muslim Komunis reproduced in Indomarxist.Net, http://www24.brinkster.com/Indomarxist/hmisbach.htm, accessed 29 March 2006 Google Scholar) for a brief outline of his life and struggles. While in exile in Papua, Misbach wrote a series of articles on Islam and Communism that appeared in a nationalist publication called Medan Moeslimin (The Muslim Terrain). 13. In this connection, it is significant that Indonesian pre‐colonial and colonial society did not produce powerful landed oligarchies as was the case in the Philippines, for example. 14. Reliable figures on union membership for this period are difficult to establish, and clearly the combined claimed membership of about 5.7 million in 1955 was an outrageous exaggeration (Hawkins 1963 Hawkins, Everett D. 1963. "'Labour in Transition'". In Indonesia, Edited by: McVey, Ruth. 248–271. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar: 260–261). Nevertheless, SOBSI, particularly prominent among lower skill, poorer workers, was undoubtedly the largest of the union federations in existence, although its claimed membership of over 2.7 million in 1958 (Hawkins 1963 Hawkins, Everett D. 1963. "'Labour in Transition'". In Indonesia, Edited by: McVey, Ruth. 248–271. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar: 260) should be approached with a considerable degree of caution. 15. For a detailed early look at this programme see R.W. Dye (1965 Dye, R.W. 1965. 'The Jakarta Faculty of Economics' Ford Foundation Report Google Scholar). Also see Ford Foundation (2003 Ford Foundation. 2003. Celebrating Indonesia: Fifty Years with the Ford Foundation 1953–2003, Jakarta: Equinox Publishing. Google Scholar). 16. For example, interview with Budi Dewantoro, Justice Party member of Yogyakarta legislature, 13 December 2000. The party later became the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS). 17. Interview with Budi Setyagraha, Yogyakarta provincial parliamentarian from PAN, on 10 December 2000. 18. Interview with Elvi Rahmita Ginting, Medan parliamentarian and a local Pemuda Pancasila women's section leader, 6 July 2001. 19. Interview 6 July 2001. 20. Interview 19 July 2003. 21. Interview 18 July 2003. The factory in question was the New Era shoe factory on the outskirts of Surabaya. It should be noted that Jakfar initially denied that this had happened until he later stated that Banser personnel allegedly involved were now being investigated. 22. Interestingly, Indonesian labour leader Muchtar Pakpahan was reported to be present at the meeting. Active in independent union organising during the New Order, he was accused of having a communist background, and once faced lengthy imprisonment for allegedly being behind labour riots that shook the city of Medan, North Sumatra, in April 1994. 23. It stands at about 220 million today.