What Went Wrong in Iraq

WITH THE TRANSFER of power to a new interim Iraqi government on June z8, the political phase of U.S. occupation came to an abrupt end. The transfer marked an urgently needed, and in some ways hopeftil, new departure for Iraq. But it did not erase, or even much ease at first, the most pressing problems confronting that beleaguered country: endemic violence, a shattered state, a nonfuinctioning economy, and a decimated society. Some of these problems may have been inevitable consequences of the war to topple Saddam Hussein. But Iraq today falls far short of what the Bush administration promised. As a result of a long chain of U.S. miscalculations, the coalition occupation has left Iraq in far worse shape than it need have and has diminished the long-term prospects of democracy there. Iraqis, Amer icans, and other foreigners continue to be kilied. What went wrong? Many of the original miscalculations made by the Bush adminis tration are well known. But the early blunders have had diflise, profound, and lasting consequences-some of which are only now becoming clear. The first and foremost of these errors concerned security: the Bush administration was never willing to commit anything like the forces necessary to ensure order in postwar Iraq. From the beginning, military experts warned Washington that the task would require, as Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki told Congress in Feb ruary 2003, hundreds of thousands of troops. For the United States