Emotions targeting moral exemplarity: Making sense of the logical geography of admiration, emulation and elevation

Despite renewed interest in moral role-modelling and its emotional underpinnings, further conceptual work is needed on the logical geography of the emotions purportedly driving it, in particular, admiration, emulation and elevation. In this article, I explore admiration (as understood by Linda Zagzebski), emulation (as understood by Aristotle) and elevation (as recently characterised by Jonathan Haidt). Although learning from moral exemplarity can, to a large extent, be accounted for on the motivational grounds of admiration and emulation, I argue that we need a concept of elevation (as a kind of moral awe) to account for attraction to transpersonal moral ideals. I explain Aristotle’s inability to make sense of people’s emotional attachment to moral exemplarity, as distinct from the attachment to moral exemplars. I bring to bear insights from another ancient emotion theorist, Mengzi (Mencius), in order to get Aristotle back on track and offer a brief educational discussion.