Design for Repair: A Game Between Manufacturer and Independent Repair Service Provider

Design for ease-of-repair is an efficient solution to effectively use resources by extending the lifespan of products. However, designing a repairable product may not be necessarily an economically viable solution for manufacturers. Repairable products enable independent repair businesses to compete with original manufacturers on offering repair services. On the other hand, although designing a less repairable product may dissuade competition, it increases the cost of repair for manufacturers at the same time, in addition to decreasing consumers’ satisfaction. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to represent the competition between a manufacturer acting as a leader, and a coalition of independent repair service providers acting as a follower. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived, representing the optimal prices for repair services offered by the two service-providers based on the level of repairability. In addition, based on the information extracted from a repair-related survey, we provide insights about consumers’ attitudes towards repairability of products to help manufacturers make better design decisions.