ABSTRACT In recent years, discourse on freedom of speech has shifted away from exclusive focus on the state and towards societal threats to speech. Amidst this change, the notion of “self‐censorship” has gained increased prominence. Not only has self‐censorship emerged as a common reference point, several recent studies identify it as embodying a corrosion of speech‐related values. Despite this, the term self‐censorship lacks a clear and settled definition, and the normative status of self‐censorship isn't self‐evident. While it can be troubling if people feel unable to speak openly, judicious silence is often a virtue, and sometimes morally required. Against this backdrop, I offer an account of a central bad‐making dimension of self‐censorship that helps us distinguish benign from pernicious forms. On this view, self‐censorship is pernicious to the extent that it involves acquiescing to others' judgments of acceptable speech or belief. Identifying what is pernicious about certain forms of self‐censorship in turn helps us sort between the types of social penalties on speech and belief that we ought to be more or less concerned about.
Gideon Elford (Wed,) studied this question.