The recent encyclical Magnifica Humanitas (MH), signed on 15 May 2026, has received global media coverage that is, objectively speaking, out of the ordinary for a papal encyclical, for at least two reasons.The first, of a biographical nature, lies in the fact that it is Pope Leo XIV’s first document, published a year after his election to the papal throne. As is always the case, the first encyclical takes on a programmatic significance, and it is in this document that one seeks the new Pontiff’s fundamental guiding principles.The second reason is certainly linked to the theme evoked in the subtitle: artificial intelligence (hereafter AI). The encyclical, in fact, forms part of a debate on this subject that is heated to say the least, a topic perceived globally as the defining issue of our time. A papal intervention on this subject therefore seems particularly apt. Here, however, comes the first contradiction: Magnifica Humanitas lends itself to an interpretation that goes beyond the stated theme of AI1. Rather, AI serves as the context, the challenging backdrop that calls for a fresh reflection on two themes, which are the very heart of the document. The first (highlighted in the subtitle) is the human person, whose dignity must be safeguarded; the second is justice, which can be taken as the key concept underpinning the Church’s social doctrine. The direct reference, in terms of both subject matter and author, is to Leo XIII, who in 1891 wrote the encyclical Rerum Novarum, dedicated to the social question in the age of the Industrial Revolution. Pope Prevost takes the name Leo XIV, 2026 precisely to emphasise the continuity of this perspective, and AI becomes the res nova of the 21st century, compelling us to reflect once more on the social structures of our time and their capacity to safeguard every person.This urgency to rethink the Church’s social doctrine – a term under which the Church’s entire reflection on issues of justice is customarily grouped – in the face of something new highlights a dynamic understanding of this body of doctrine which may come as a surprise, both within and outside the Church, particularly to those accustomed to thinking of Christian doctrine as a closed monolith, essentially to be repeated, disseminated and explained. This helps us to understand the meaning of the first chapter, aptly entitled “A Dynamic Thought Faithful to the Gospel,” which aims to present a historical overview of the doctrine and to justify what might be described as a genuine updating, necessitated by the new techno-cultural context 2.Understanding AI as a res nova is a decisive step in the encyclical’s proposal. These technologies differ from others and therefore require a new social framework.The first novelty is of a fundamental nature. We are faced with ambiguous technologies that cannot be defined unambiguously (MH 99). The process of imitating certain human functions – which is often particularly effective – means that AI systems cannot easily be compared to other machines. An LLM is a machine, but it is not like a domestic blender or a calculator: it imitates but does not comprehend; it speaks and listens but does not understand. This difference is captured by a particularly apt passage: “current AI systems are more ‘cultivated’ than “built”, for developers do not directly design every detail, but instead create a framework within which the intelligence ‘grows.’” (MH 98).The second development is more quantitative in nature. According to the Encyclical, no technology is neutral, despite the fact that certain schools of thought within scientific and technological discourse claim such neutrality, effectively placing all moral responsibility solely on end-users. Pope Leo states (MH 104) that AI, too, is not neutral, but the manner and speed with which such technologies are developed and implemented particularly accentuate the rise in social injustice, the impact on the environment, the exacerbation of armed conflicts, and educational challenges. This twofold novelty makes AI the major innovation characterising the start of the millennium, deserving of attention and renewed reflection.The category of res nova is therefore decisive: we have said that AI is neither a neutral nor merely a new technology; rather, it is a qualitative transformation of social and cognitive conditions. They produce informational configurations endowed with operational value, but meaning continues to emerge from human interpretation and from the social contexts within which these configurations are used. For this reason, the production of information does not coincide with either the production of meaning or the assumption of responsibility for the consequences generated by that information.This difference has significant educational implications: we must ask ourselves not only about the use of technology, but also about the human capacities that must be preserved. Learning to exercise “restraint in the use of AI” does not mean rejecting technology, but safeguarding critical thinking and responsibility. In this sense, a further point concerns the political and social dimension: it is not enough to moralise the machine or rely on technical alignment processes. We need to hold a public debate on the criteria of justice that guide the design and governance of information systems 3.In this context, a conceptual clarification is also required. The extension of the concept of agency to unintentional information-producing systems (Floridi and Sanders, 2004), as it has gained ground in contemporary ethical literature, introduces a dilution of responsibility that is unnecessary both from an explanatory and a normative perspective. Such systems can, rather, be adequately described as producers of information, without attributing to them a new status: that of agents in the proper sense. This is not a matter of restricting the concept of agency, but of re-establishing the conditions for its intelligibility: in the tradition of the philosophy of action, acting implies understanding and intentionality (Anscombe, 1957). Artificial systems produce effects, but do not act in this sense; consequently, the distinction between agency and information production makes it possible to avoid a conceptual overlap that undermines the notion of responsibility. The chain of responsibility remains entirely attributable to the human actors who design, implement and govern such systems.The attribution of forms of agency to artificial systems often stems from descriptive needs linked to the growing complexity of contemporary socio-technical environments. Speaking of artificial agents may seem useful for representing systems that produce significant effects, interact with other systems and influence individual and collective decisions. However, what may be functional at a descriptive level risks becoming problematic at a normative level. When the language of agency is extended to entities lacking understanding and intentionality, there is a risk of obscuring the human actors who are actually responsible for design choices, implementation methods and the social consequences of technological systems. The complexity of socio-technical networks does not eliminate human responsibility; on the contrary, it makes it more difficult to identify and, for this reason, even more important to preserve. The more decisions are distributed amongst organisations, infrastructure and automated processes, the more necessary it becomes to maintain a clear understanding of the responsibilities involved.From this perspective, the encyclical’s emphasis on the centrality of the person is not merely an anthropological statement, but a clear stance on the nature of moral responsibility. In support of this argument, the principle of explanatory parsimony suggests that we should not multiply unnecessary conceptual levels. Responsibility is not dispersed within technological systems, but returns in a clearer form that cannot be delegated to human beings. It is from this perspective that the “magnifica humanitas” can be understood as the capacity to consciously assume the consequences of information production in the age of AI.However, his clear understanding of the issues raised by the development of AI systems does not lead Pope Leo to an apocalyptic and essentially restrictive interpretation of the phenomenon, which is also typical of certain Catholic circles.The title of the Encyclical is exemplary in this regard: magnificent humanity. It stems from the most genuine Catholic approach to reality, which is always fundamentally positive despite the mystery of evil that marks human nature (in theological terms, this is referred to as original sin).Humanity is magnificent, and for this reason deserves to be safeguarded; humanity is magnificent and therefore already possesses the tools and strength to manage this phenomenon as well. The final exhortation, far from being a mere aspiration towards the good, identifies virtuous approaches and practices which the Pontiff addresses to all readers.This approach calls for a decisive shift in the text’s guiding questions: the issue is no longer simply one of regulation, prohibition and reduction (although these options do appear in a few instances in relation to specific situations), but rather one of a broader and deeper inquiry into the future of humanity. “For this very reason, crucial questions impose themselves on our conscience and can no longer be avoided: Where are we going? Towards what goal do we wish to orient ourselves? What direction should we choose as a people and as a human community?” (MH §6).The methodological guidance offered by the Encyclical is the final aspect we wish to highlight. The approach is biblical and narrative: Pope Leo cites Nehemiah, a biblical figure unknown to most, who was called upon to rebuild Jerusalem after the Babylonian exile. The Pontiff emphasises the path chosen by Nehemiah: “the city is reborn, not through the initiative of one man, but through the shared responsibility of all: men, women, priests, artisans, heads of households and young people all play a part.” (MH §8) and again: “Rebuilding today means recognising that, precisely from the plurality of voices and visions – which, even though they sometimes remind us of the confusion caused by the diversity of spoken languages – a bright possibility emerges. Indeed, this is the possibility of building together, of transforming diversity into a resource, and of making listening and dialogue the common ground upon which to cultivate justice and fraternity.” (MH §10)Whilst this message resonates powerfully, first and foremost within the Church itself – which in many quarters is tempted to adopt a defensive stance whilst waiting for better times – it is, on the other hand, a genuine call to action that treats diversity as a precious (and therefore challenging) gift rather than an insurmountable obstacle.The approach becomes clearer when, building precisely on this necessary shared understanding, the Pope reminds us that: “We cannot be satisfied with merely calling for the moralisation of machines — the so-called “alignment” of AI with human values — without also having the courage to insist on a further condition: the possibility of openly discussing the ethical frameworks involved and subjecting them to shared standards of social justice. Otherwise, those who control AI will impose their own moral vision, which will become the invisible infrastructure of these systems. A more moral AI is not enough if that morality is determined by a select few. What is needed is a more active political involvement capable of slowing things down when everything is accelerating, and of safeguarding opportunities for communities to continue to participate and ask questions.” (MH §107)The decisive role of the State and of politics is a recurring theme in the Encyclical, which recognises that both these institutions have a vital role to play in bringing about the common good.Adopting the approach of Nehemiah, which calls for broad and structured participation by all stakeholders, becomes particularly significant in a globalised world and in the context of technology that is, by definition, global in the ways in which it is developed and disseminated. On this point, it must be acknowledged that the text is essentially Western in its fundamental structure and the themes it addresses. In the coming months, it will be interesting to see whether and how the encyclical – and, even more so, the issues it raises – have been received and discussed in Asia and Africa. To envisage rebuilding Jerusalem without the active and respectful participation of the so-called Global South is unrealistic and unjust. It is decidedly at odds with a text that, dutifully and courageously, calls for justice in our time.The real challenge posed by AI, in fact, does not lie in building ever more sophisticated machines, but in preserving the social, political and cultural conditions that make genuinely human responsibility possible. In other words, the decisive question is therefore not whether machines will become more human, but whether human beings will be able to remain responsible in a world increasingly mediated by machines.It is perhaps in this sense that the Magnifica Humanitas evoked by Leo XIV can become the guiding principle of a new era of ethical and social reflection.
Marturano et al. (Thu,) studied this question.