This article explores whether the European Union requires a dedicated judicial mechanism to address grand corruption and white-collar crime involving public officials, particularly when national systems fail to prosecute due to political interference or structural weaknesses. Using doctrinal legal research, comparative analysis, and case studies from EU Member States, the paper identifies persistent enforcement gaps in the current multi-level anti-corruption architecture. Although institutions like the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) have improved coordination, they lack binding enforcement powers and cannot fully address entrenched impunity. Building on the principle of complementarity as defined in international criminal law, the paper proposes the establishment of a European Court for White-Collar Crime with jurisdiction to intervene only when domestic authorities are unwilling or unable to act. Such an institution would preserve Member State sovereignty while providing a neutral forum for independent investigations and prosecution. The proposed court could strengthen accountability, ensure legal consistency across the Union, and reinforce public trust in the rule of law.
Andreea-Nicoleta Dragomir (2025) studied this question.