Abstract This essay considers Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of Christian morality as a template for interpreting the epistemology of modern conspiracy theorists. The first section elucidates Nietzsche's notion of ressentiment as it can be applied to contemporary conspiracism. The effectiveness of this comparative assessment thus raises the question of what true knowledge is. This is problematic, however, insofar as Nietzsche's critique of ressentiment explicitly applies to scientific objectivity as well as Christian morality. After evaluating the historical and epistemic similarities between conspiracism and objectivism in the second section, then, the third section of this essay explores Nietzschean vitalism as an epistemic asceticism in an informational milieu. Nietzsche's perspectivism and his emphasis on the lived nature of true knowledge forms a link with a Christian incarnational understanding of truth which comes to light against the abstraction of both scientific and conspiratorial ressentiment . The resources within Christian thought for espousing this incarnational epistemology are briefly surveyed in the concluding theological section. Nietzsche's critique of religious epistemology therefore ironically alerts us to the specifically Christian resources for positing an incarnational epistemology which may in fact prove essential in responding to rampant conspiracism in an informational age.
J.W. Olson (Thu,) studied this question.