Hindsight is AN/TPY-2: revisiting the role of Chinese nuclear strike in decision making around the Korea THAAD episode

This article revisits the 2016 U.S. Forces Korea Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unit deployment and subsequent Chinese economic and diplomatic coercion of South Korea. With the benefit of hindsight, this study challenges the narrative that a large perception gap existed between the actors involved regarding THAAD's implications for China's strategic nuclear deterrent. Drawing on publicly available context and applying a rational-actor lens, it finds that while the U.S. may have shown some earlier interest in potentially degrading China's second strike through forward-deployed radars like THAAD's AN/TPY-2, there is no indication that it expected the Korea deployment to do so, even at the margin. China's motivations are more reconcilable with those of the U.S. and South Korea than is generally assumed, with the motive of preserving nuclear deterrence neither sufficient nor necessary to explain its decision to coerce Seoul. The case underscores the value of interpretive approaches rooted in the assumption of more or less rational behavior, evaluated within broader contexts of beliefs and values. In analyzing Beijing's motivations in particular, the findings caution against both mirror imaging and the privileging of interlocutions and content from researchers and scholars above expectations of rationality and cognizance of the overall context.