Small states are often assumed to benefit from the procedural equality of multilateral bodies, yet only a few consistently obtain senior agenda‑setting positions in international parliamentary institutions. Why? This article examines the nine Council of Europe member states that each hold three seats in the Parliamentary Assembly and advances a behavioural explanation centred on three traits: commitment (roll-call attendance and report authorship), continuity (retention of experienced delegates), and consensus (internal voting cohesion). Drawing on delegate biographies and 305 resolution roll‑call votes (2014–2021), the study develops indicators for each of the three Cs, combines them into a composite CCC Index, and relates this index to the cumulative time each delegation's members served as Assembly President, Committee Chair, or General Rapporteur. The Spearman rank‑order correlation between the CCC Index and agenda-setting yield is ρ = 0.92 (p ≈ 0.00053), indicating a strong association between behavioural performance and institutional outcomes. Delegations scoring highly across all dimensions account for over 90% of leadership days, whereas those underperforming on any one dimension accumulate few or none. The findings contribute to small‑state theory by illustrating that multilateral opportunities reward consistent parliamentary engagement, refine the literature on parliamentary diplomacy by linking leadership outcomes to cumulative routine practices, and offer a replicable framework for comparing small‑state influence across international parliamentary institutions.
Laura Gil-Besada (Tue,) studied this question.
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