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This is a Quantitative Study study.

September 17, 2025

An Efficient and Incentive‐Compatible Dynamic Multi‐Item Auction Under Budget Constraints

Key Points

The auction generates an efficient outcome that is both core and strongly Pareto efficient.
When bidders are not budget-constrained, the auction achieves a Walrasian equilibrium with minimal prices.
Valuations and budgets remain private information, aligning with the auction's incentive compatibility.
The proposed method addresses unit demand and heterogeneous goods in bidding strategies.

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper proposes an efficient and incentive‐compatible dynamic auction for selling multiple heterogeneous indivisible goods when bidders have unit demand, quasi‐linear preferences, and hard budgets. Valuations and budgets are private information. The auction generates an efficient outcome that is not only in the core but also strongly Pareto efficient. When no bidder is budget‐constrained, the auction returns a Walrasian equilibrium with the minimal equilibrium prices.

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