Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos and the Balance of Power in South Asia: Pakistan’s Deterrence against Indian Military Escalation

The purpose of this study was to assess how Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos affected Pakistan's deterrence posture in South Asia and domestic security, as well as how it interacted with India's military escalation tactics and larger regional security dynamics. Launched in 2017, the operation marked a turning point in Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, reshaping its deterrence equilibrium and bringing stability back to the country. The introduction highlighted the importance of modernizing deterrence in a nuclearized but conventionally asymmetric South Asia and described the ongoing challenge of striking a balance between external threats and internal security vulnerabilities. The study adopted a mixed-method approach, combining quantitative analysis of security, military, and nuclear indicators with qualitative review of policy statements and secondary literature from 2016–2023.Results demonstrated that terrorist incidents, civilian and military casualties, and cross-border infiltration cases declined significantly, reflecting the operation’s domestic security dividends. Simultaneously, Pakistan improved its military readiness through enhanced rapid deployment capacity, joint exercises, and armoured modernization, while strengthening nuclear deterrence via missile testing, rhetorical signalling, and progress toward triad deployment. On the regional front, India’s military exercises and ceasefire violations revealed sustained escalation tendencies, yet Pakistan’s global military ranking improved and security partnerships expanded. The study concluded that Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos provided Pakistan with a strategic window to reinforce deterrence credibility. Future research should investigate how integrated deterrence and evolving regional alignments could mitigate the risks of escalation in South Asia’s volatile security environment. References Ahmed, A., theory and practice in changing South Asian strategic stability. Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses, 7(2), 101-120. https://doi.org/10.57169/jssa.007.02.034 Khan, A., & Raza, F. (2025). Pakistan’s military strategy and India’s escalation calculus: Post-2025 crisis reflections. International Politics, 62(1), 95–112. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-025-00492 Khattak, M. U. R., & Kundi, M. A. (2024). Conventional asymmetries between India and Pakistan: A threat to the deterrence stability of South Asia. Journal of Political Studies, 31(1), 45-62. Malik, S. (2025). Conventional asymmetry and rapid mobilization: A case study of Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos. Journal of Defence Studies, 19(2), 67–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/0971523125602 Mehmood, N., & Asif, S. Z. (2024). Analysing conventional deterrence in a nuclearised South Asia. Margalla Papers, 28(2), 14–32. https://doi.org/10.54690/margallapapers.28.2.271 Nawaz, Z. (2024). Continuity or change? Strategic doctrines and crisis behavior in India–Pakistan relations. Asian Survey, 64(6), 1032–1050. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2024.64.6.1032 Qureshi, M. (2025). Counterterrorism and deterrence: Pakistan’s evolving military posture. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 36(3), 421–440. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2025.006 Raeesa, U., & Akhtar, N. (2025). India-Pakistan security dilemma: Analyzing the deterrence and coercive diplomacy in the context of regional stability. Journal of Development and Social Sciences, 6(II), 42–53. https://doi.org/10.47205/jdss.2025(6-II)42 Rehman, F. (2024). Full spectrum deterrence: Pakistan’s doctrinal evolution and strategic implications. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 18(1), 77–98. https://doi.org/10.3109/ssq.2024.001 Satakzai, S. K., & Alamgir, A. (2024). Nuclear deterrence and crisis stability: Assessing its role in averting conventional war between India and Pakistan post-Pulwama. Pakistan Journal of International Affairs, 7(3). https://doi.org/10.52337/pjia.v7i3.1142 Shah, A. (2023). Deterrence under surveillance: Indian space-based ISR capabilities and Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence. Journal of Security & Strategic Analyses, 8(2), 7–26. https://doi.org/10.57169/jssa.008.02.0201 Shamsi, Z. U. H. (2024). Introducing the framework model for the evaluation of deterrent value of states. NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability, 7(2), 15-30. https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v7i2.170 Sharma, R. (2024). India’s punitive strikes and the lowering of escalation thresholds. Journal of Asian Affairs, 55(2), 145–163. https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2024.004 Siddiqui, N. (2023). Conventional deterrence in a nuclearized dyad: South Asian lessons. Defence Studies, 23(4), 392-409. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2023.001 Sultan, A., Haider, F., & Jamy, S. H. (2023). Integrated deterrence: Relevance & implications for South Asia. Margalla Papers, 27(2). https://doi.org/10.54690/margallapapers.27.2.176 Yousaf, U. (2023). Post-1998 crises and the limits of deterrence in South Asia. Asian Security, 19(3), 233–250. https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2023.006