This paper analyzes the central role of free will and the principle of mutual esteem in Descartes’ ethics. It first examines the relationship between free will and community in Parts II and III of the Discourse on the Method. In Part II, Descartes presents the firm resolution of the will as an essential requirement for carrying out radical doubt, and in Part III he elevates free will to the status of a fundamental feature of human existence through the provisional morality. On this basis, the paper interprets the provisional morality as an incomplete morality, locating its limitation in the absence of the theme of mutual esteem. It then shows how the principle of mutual esteem is developed through the concept of “charity” in the Letter to Voetius and the notion of “generosity” in the Passions of the Soul. Thus, for Descartes, mutual esteem is grounded in the doctrine of free will confirmed in the provisional morality and is defined as esteem among free subjects. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that Descartes moves beyond a closed individualism toward an 'open individualism' founded on mutual esteem.
Joo-Jin Paik (Sun,) studied this question.