Non-Borda elections under relaxed IIA conditions

Arrow's celebrated Impossibility Theorem asserts that an election rule, or Social Welfare Function (SWF), between three or more candidates meeting a set of strict criteria cannot exist. Maskin suggests that Arrow's conditions for SWFs are too strict. In particular he weakens the "Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives" condition (IIA), which states that if in two elections, each voter's binary preference between candidates cᵢ and cⱼ is the same, then the two results must agree on their preference between cᵢ and cⱼ. Instead, he proposes a modified IIA condition (MIIA). Under this condition, the result between cᵢ and cⱼ can be affected not just by the order of cᵢ and cⱼ in each voter's ranking, but also the number of candidates between them. More candidates between cᵢ and cⱼ communicates some information about the strength of a voter's preference between the two candidates, and Maskin argues that it should be admissible evidence in deciding on a final ranking. We construct SWFs for three-party elections which meet the MIIA criterion along with other sensibility criteria, but are far from being Borda elections (where each voter assigns a score to each candidate linearly according to their ranking). On the other hand, we give cases in which any SWF must be the Borda rule.