Issues in Grounded Cognition and how to solve them – The Minimalist Account

The field of grounded cognition is concerned with how concepts are represented by being embedded in the bodily modalities. Considerable empirical work supports this core tenet, but the field is rife with meta-theoretical issues which prevent meaningful progress. We describe these issues and provide a solution: an overarching theoretical framework. The two most commonly cited grounded cognition theories are perceptual symbol systems and conceptual metaphor theory. Under perceptual symbol systems, concepts are represented by integrating fragments of multi-modal percepts in a simulator. Conceptual metaphor theory involves a limited number of image schemas, primitive structural regularities extracted from interaction with the environment, undergoing a limited number of transformations into a concept. Both theories constitute important developments to understanding mental representations, yet we argue that currently, they impede progress because they are prematurely elaborate. This forces them to rely on overly specific assumptions, which generates a lack of conceptual clarity and unsystematic testing of empirical work. Our minimalist account takes grounded cognition ‘back to basics’ with a common-denominator framework supported by converging evidence from other fields. It postulates that concepts are represented by simulation, re-activating the mental states that were active when experiencing this concept, and metaphoric mapping, when concrete representations serve to represent abstract concepts. This enables incremental theory development without uncertain assumptions because it enables falsificationist methods, while allowing for explorative or descriptive research. Our proposal counteracts meta-theoretical issues and encourages a falsificationist research program that allows to integrate grounded cognition into the cognitive sciences.