Historical Context of the Irrelevance of Superior Orders in International Criminal Law—Concurrently Discussing the Rational Construction of this Principle in the Rome Statute

Regarding the principle in international criminal law that obeying superior orders does not relieve one of criminal responsibility, previous research lacks systematic and comprehensive excavation of its internal logic. Reviewing the historical context of criminal responsibility for obeying superior orders, it has undergone a developmental process from "superior responsibility" to "the irrelevance of obeying superior orders." In terms of imputation models, instruments of international criminal law like the Nuremberg Charter established the principle of absolute liability, while the Rome Statute adopts a conditional principle of absolute liability. Systematically analyzing the theoretical basis of this principle reveals that it takes the principle of individual criminal responsibility as a prerequisite condition, prioritizes humanitarianism over state sovereignty in the balance of values, and bases culpability on the subordinate's independent rationality. Based on this, analyzing the responsibility system concerning obeying superior orders in the Rome Statute reveals problems: the imputation model deviates from customary international law, the justification for exculpation based on mistake of law is questionable, and grounds for mitigating criminal responsibility are lacking. In response, through interpretative and legislative theories, its responsibility model should be reconstructed under the "dual guidance" of the Statute's purpose and customary international law, establishing or recognizing grounds for mitigating responsibility as exceptions.