This article examines Saṃghabhadra's theory of simultaneity. Drawing on his account of time, I argue that his system must be taken to entail two types of simultaneity between events/entities: one grounded in their occurring at the same moment, and another grounded in the impossibility of further distinguishing them as earlier or later. I further contend that the latter type of simultaneity shifts with changes in the reference point, whereas the former does not. Thus, Saṃghabhadra affirms both absolute and relative simultaneity. Finally, I analyse the features of these two types and suggest that in his attempt to balance theoretical analysis with experiential considerations, Saṃghabhadra rejects the everyday notion of a global present while maintaining the idea of a local present. This distinctive stance sets his account apart both from everyday thought of simultaneity and from those shaped by special relativity.
Jincheng Li (Sun,) studied this question.